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ABSTRACT
Despite the fact that a number of studies have focused on different types of prison
victimization, very little research has investigated inmate economic conflict. This study
describes the context of inmate economic conflict and examines the factors that may
account for the development of this conflict in female housing facilities. The secondary
data analysis study is based on validated survey data from 3499 female inmates housed in
fifteen correctional facilities located in seven different states. In addition to conducting
descriptive statistical analyses, inmate economic conflict scores were regressed on a
range of individual-related (background) and social climate-related (environmental)
variables. This study found that the social climate factors accounted for more variance in
economic conflict than the individual and demographic characteristics of the prisoners.
These results provide further evidence that environment is a key factor when it comes to
examining inmate economic conflict. Implications of these findings for future research
and correctional practice are presented.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Introduction to the Problem
At any given point in time the majority of individuals behind bars are adult males.
As a consequence, most of the research on prison violence and victimization pertains to
male inmates (Bowker, 1980). In 2010, there were a little less than 113, 000 women
under the jurisdiction of State and Federal correctional authorities, compared to
1,500,000 male inmates (Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, 2011). Therefore,
currently women comprise approximately 7.5 percent of the total prison population.
“Forgotten offenders” is a reference that can be often heard when discussing to women
prisoners (Chesney-Lind, 1986). There is a reason for that. Due to their small number
within the correctional population, and their tendency to do time quietly without causing
significant problems, policy makers rarely had enough resources to consider female needs
and issues.
In the past few decades the number of female inmates has increased
exponentially. Between 1990 and 2010, the number of female prisoner more than
doubled, from 44, 000 to 113, 000. This increase drew a significant amount of attention
to women‟s lives behind bars, their adjustment to prison subculture, their needs and
issues, as well as their victimization and conflicts. While researchers were able to
uncover certain realities, such as the pains of imprisonment, significant deprivation
issues, physical and physiological victimization, the prison economic system and
challenges that it creates were overlooked.
1

In his work on inmate victimization, Bowker (1980) stated the following:
Investigators of prison behavior in correctional institutions for women
have been so busy looking at lesbianism and its correlates that they have
been unable to find time to examine stealing and other forms of economic
victimization in most of their studies. (p. 84).
There might be another reason for the lack of research on economic conflict. Most
researchers who have typically studied correctional institutions received their training in
sociology and psychology; therefore, their research focus dealt with other aspects of the
inmate culture (Williams & Fish, 1974). Still another reason for overlooking inmate
economic victimization might be the nature of the conflict. Economic conflict
substantially diminishes the overall perception of safety and usually precipitates more
severe forms of violence such as retaliation or extortion (Owen, Wells, Pollock, Muscat,
& Torres, 2008). However, economic victimization by itself is not defined as violence per
se (Owen et al., 2008). Therefore, at first glance, prison economic conflict does not
present an imminent threat to safety and security and hence, usually yields attention to
other types of prison victimization.
This study is designed to describe inmate economic conflict as it presently exists
in contemporary penal institutions for women. Factors that may influence economic
conflict and victimization directly or implicitly will be scrutinized and presented. The
study will also examine the relationship of broader social, economic, political, and
cultural factors to economic conflict in the prison society. Finally, I will demonstrate
whether importation or deprivation factors are more important in predicting economic
conflict.
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Prison as an Island of Poverty
The word “prison” entails forceful images. It invokes images of stone walls or
fences strung on top with concertina wire. The word may remind us of muscled, tattooed,
and menacing “career criminals” images that are provided and distorted by the mass
media. Finally, when thinking about prison we easily imagine armed guards who devote
their career and life to protect the general public from dangerous and violent “super
predators.” However, a visit to a correctional facility may shed some light on the
contradictions between these images and reality.
In reality, prison is a warehouse for hundreds and even thousands of inmates who
spend several months to several years in secure settings (Irwin, 2005). These inmates
have to deal with a number of issues and problems such as physical and sexual violence,
harassment and assaults, staff misconduct and excessive use of power. Bowker (1980)
discovered that prisoners are subject to four types of prison victimization: physical,
economic, physiological and social. Economic victimization is the main topic of this
paper.
Indeed, it is hard to overestimate the role of the economy in the everyday life of
an individuals, communities and whole countries. With this in mind I was eager to find
out how the economy shapes concrete material conditions in prison as well as how it
sustains social and power relations.
Prison has deliberately been made an island of poverty (Williams & Fish, 1974).
Therefore, inmate economic conflict is an issue that is always present in any prison, but it
scarcely can be resolved under the contemporary penal system. Occurrences of thefts,
bribery or illegal trading are very common in the majority of correctional institutions, but
these instances tend not to be disclosed. Inmate hustling exists in institutions regardless
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of place and time; it is a notion that many professionals in the field are aware of and
many of them are desperately fighting against.
Literature suggests that networks of black market exchange or the sub rosa
economy circulate throughout the inmate population within all penal institutions (Casella,
2000). The reason for this is simple. The prison‟s formal economic system provides only
the essentials if not less. However, exigencies of prisoners are hardly different from
everyday needs of the general population. Safety is the first priority; however, pressed
trousers or t-shirts, hot water, jewelry, and cosmetics are in high demand as well. Among
the most valuable material goods there are cell phones, coffee, candies, chocolate bars,
sandwiches, alcohol, cigarettes and of course drugs. Whereas in the free world it is just a
candy, inside the prison is a high value good or even a currency because it is a ticket to
the black market. Each of these goods can be, sold, traded and gambled because each
item is inherently money. So the black market economy indeed exists in prison. Inmates
generally identify this economy as a hustle. It exists despite walls, fences or deprivation
of liberty. It exists because of necessity. It brings money, and money that has the ability
to bring comfort when confined. More fundamentally still, it brings money that allows for
commodity exchange.
Illegal activity inside the institution takes the form of complex social structural
networks. Both male and female inmates are active participants in these networks.
Casella (2000) found archeological evidence of sexual barter and illicit market exchange
that boosted the underground economy of a nineteenth- century Australian female penal
colony. Here inmates having in possession a limited number of material goods ascribed
high value to every commodity that circulated within the prison. Desire to obtain an
invaluable item made it worthwhile to fight for this item. The means by which it can be
obtained do not matter anymore. “I will do anything for a cup of coffee” said one of the
4

female inmates in the county jail (Wells et al., 2012). Bosworth (as cited in Slotboom,
Kruttschnitt, Bijleveld, & Menting, 2011) suggests that women use their ethnicity,
religion, sexuality and femininity to cope with oppressive penal regimes.
The majority of other reviewed studies examined only male inmates. Women
were largely neglected in attempts to enlarge, explain, or critique government efforts to
supervise and correct precarious men (Chesney-Lind, 1986). “It was as though crime and
punishment existed in a world in which gender equaled male” (Chesney-Lind as cited in
Talvi, 2007, p.4). Only the rapid and ongoing growth of the female inmate population has
brought tremendous scholarly and public attention to women‟s correctional institutions.
Several attempts have been made to address gender differences in criminological
theories. However, the theoretical framework surrounding women inmates does not
transform immediately into institutional policies, changes in the criminal law, or facility
procedures.
Significance of the Study
As we found in the literature, the information that pertains to inmate economic
conflict is limited and does not explain the origin and the scope of the economic conflict
problem. However, even a quick look at the surveys administered as part of this study
shows that the economic conflict in housing units indeed exists and has a potential to
significantly influence on the overall perceptions of safety in the facilities.
Just because it is more common to think that economic conflict is a
straightforward cause of physical or sexual violence, the relationship of these constructs
is not necessarily linear. In contrary, we see different conflicts in the facility are mutually
enhancing and perpetrate each other simultaneously. Meanwhile, not denying that
economic conflict might be a true reason of why other conflict exists, we suspect that the
relationship is rather reciprocal. We found it important to look at the roots of economic
5

conflict itself. Considering economic conflict as a dependent variable might help us to
understand the factors that result in inmates‟ debts, stealing, or necessity to pay for
“protection,” as well as the role of the institution in facilitating such activities.
The inmate economy penetrates all facets of prison life. On the one hand, inmate
economic relations have a potential to maintain stable market relationships between
prisoners when rules are clear, resources are accessible and regulation of social relations
are certain and straightforward. On the other hand, inmate economic conflict has a
potential to transform into more severe forms of violence, when prisoners have to fight
for the scarce resources, and when “correctional personnel, reflecting the general
attitudes of the American society, believe that the inmates are not entitled to an
abundance of consumer goods…” (Williams & Fish, 1974 p. 9).
The aforesaid ideology, according to Pashukanis (1978), has a long lasting result
on punishment practices. Considering prison as a microcosm of the wider society,
Pashukanis (1978) stated that the direction punishment takes and the ways prisoners are
treated in correctional institutions, will mirror the principles of economic exchange in
wider society. Therefore, both inmate culture and inmate economic relationships, as well
as wider culture and forms of economic relationships under the capitalist mode of
production, have the potential to affect order and stability in the institution. By studying
the ways in which wider culture originates and penetrates into every part of social life in
the facility, the scientific world as well as practitioners will gain a better understanding of
the etiology of economic conflict and will be able to influence or negate destructive
corollaries of the latter. Being able to find the main causes of economic conflict would
mean better control and better management of it through more suitable policies, better
staff training and better understanding of the importance of anti-conflicts practices. This
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study, like the majority of prison studies, ultimately aims to make prison a safer place for
inmates to live and a better place for staff to work.
This study is based on two significant but controversial theories of the 20th
century. Deprivation and importation theories both seek to explain the origin of prison
subculture as well as prisoners‟ adjustments to it. This study will examine which theory
has better ability to explain economic conflict in prison.
The dominance of deprivation or importation factors will give us invaluable
insight into understanding female prisoners‟ adaptations to incarceration. The
understanding of human interactions throughout confinement may result in the
application of more effective crime control policies. If importation factors are found to
have a more significant effect on female carceral experiences, then successful adaptation
in prison can be predicted based upon factors such as seriousness of the crime, histories
of victimization, drug abuse, as well as demographic characteristics of the inmate.
The prevalence of the deprivation model instead will suggest that the attention
should be redirected from individual characteristics of the inmate to the conditions of the
confinement. These characteristics include but are not limited to effective regulation of
the capacity of the facility, its security level, proper staff education, and the existence of
educational and rehabilitation programs.
The intent of this work is not to test the aforesaid theories. I will use the latter as a
foundation that will be used to guide our interpretations. Even though the subsequent
quantitative analysis will reveal some support for the particular theory, we will use our
findings as a working tool and apply them to refine the theoretical framework and
exemplify some implications for practice.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

Theoretical Framework
The economic conflict theoretical framework will be presented through the prism
of its evolvement and development from the culture that penetrates the institution.
Culture that shapes the institution is a multifaceted phenomenon. It is comprised of public
and private social space, of individual characteristics and institutional environment.
Finally culture is affected by broader economical, political and social forces. All of the
aspects of culture and forces influencing it will be scrutinized and linked to how they
influence inmate economic conflict.
There is a common stereotype that prison is a dysfunctional institution that has
failed in its high hopes to rehabilitate or provide care to inmates. To the contrary,
contemporary penal institutions serve only as a warehouse that holds thousands of
prisoners under stringent control and arduous deprivation (Irwin, 2005). “We have
arrived at the time when penal institutions of the past have either disappeared or are
surviving by not more than force of habit, but without others born which correspond
better to the new aspirations of the moral conscience ” (Durkheim as cited in Garland,
1990, p.41). Pashukanis (1980) and Garland (1990) both agreed upon the existence of the
idea of equity or fair trading in justice, according to which the state exchanges one
adverse behavior (crime) for another equable one (prison sentence). In other words,
individuals committing criminal act will involuntary “signs the state issued contract”
regarding obligation of acceptance of punishment in the form of deprivation of liberty for
a specified time. This fair trading mentality in the capitalist society leads the public to
consider the prison institution as an indispensable part of fair transaction, in which the
8

offender „pays his debt‟. Our cultural fabric tells us that if this is the way we have always
punished, then it is the right thing to do. However, taking this approach, society tends to
not think about people behind bars as individuals who have needs and issues (Kappeler,
2011). All together, it leaves unattended issues of various kinds of conflict and abuse in
prisons, including instances that occur in female facilities with disturbing frequency.
Conflicts do not exist in a vacuum. There is no conflict unless there are
individuals and there is an unstable environment that will feed and reproduce the conflict.
Through examination of both individual and environmental factors, this paper will
analyze how the conflicts, and in particular, inmate economic conflict, develops in the
correctional facility. It will also explain how the modern culture contributes to conflict
escalation and long term survival.
Clemmer‟s concept of “prisonization”, introduced in 1940, posits a positive
correlation between the length of the incarceration and the conformity to the norms and
values of prison culture (Slotboom et al., 2011). Today, we also eminently conclude that
prisonization diffuses and assimilates staff the same way as it does inmates in the
institution. This notion is important because, on the one hand, a prisonization
phenomenon engenders the tension between the mentalities of inmates and staff. On the
other hand, it requires inmates to establish facades and actions that they have to have for
the public in a particular space and time. This tension will be further described in the
public and private culture of the prison.
Public Culture of the Prison
Prison, as any other social institution, presents a unique ultimate environment that
inmates and staff have to deal and comply with on a daily basis. This environment can be
referred to as the public culture of the institution or the prison social space. Public culture
includes the impressions that individuals express in order to establish a particular
9

reputation while preserving respect and honor. This culture shapes every individual that
lives or works in the institution.
According to Johnson (1997), public prison social space is dominated by state
nurtured convicts. They are angry and dissatisfied with no access to work, education or
other legitimate options. The prison yard, now and for many years ahead, is their home.
Therefore, they intimidate, provoke, and act violent toward other inmates and staff. The
female public culture is substantially less violent, but more dramatic. Prisoners who do
not belong to the elite group often experience exploitation, psychological torture, sexual
and other kinds of coercion. Females respond more emotionally to situations. Female
inmates typically do not present serious physical harm to staff , but the female population
can be very manipulative (Talvi, 2007.)
Guards, just like inmates, are adapting to a particular prison culture which is
generally dominated by mindless, confident and brutal custodians (Johnson, 1997). It is
further dominated by those who have a will to be powerful, and aspire to fully exercise
this will. The idea that underlies this statement is that in order to have control over a
situation, officers are supposed to be morally superior to inmates. “…the treatment staff
and guards deserve one another‟s bad company, but the inmates certainly deserve better!”
(Johnson, 1997, p. 201.)
Ironically, though the public prison social space has been dominated by numerical
minority of both inmates and officers, their influence of this subculture is gigantic. The
majority of the inmates do not belong to the public convict culture. Nor do the majority
of the officers tend to subscribe to ruling by rigidity, threat and force. However, in order
to avoid victimization, both inmates and officers have to comply and follow the dynamics
of toughness, intimidation and superiority in the institution.
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Private Culture of the Prison
Officers‟ and inmates‟ private culture refers to how individuals truly adapt to the
pain of imprisonment regardless of the facade they think they have to display for public
consumption. According to Owen (1998), the majority of the staff aspire to be effective
and responsible human beings who provide different services to the inmates such as
security, protection, counseling, etc. By doing so officers make prison a better place for
staff to work and safer place for inmates to live. There is a common stereotype among
staff that characterizes inmates as lazy, idle, and non-cooperative individuals. However,
responsible staff members are able to see beyond those stereotypes and find individual
approaches to inmates (Owen, 1998). In this thesis we will omit details about the staff‟s
adjustment to the prison work environment as well as the internal dynamics of the
institution, and concentrate our attention on inmates‟ adjustment to prison and their
assimilation into prison culture. Literature offers two models that seek to explain
inmates‟ private culture, their adaptations, and their experiences.
Deprivation Model
The model stresses that the characteristics of the prison environment are the most
important factors in understanding the adjustment to prison life (Sykes, 1971; orig. edn.,
1958). Sykes (1971) argued that prison subculture and inmates‟ adjustment to prison are
closely aligned to the conditions of confinement, and these conditions represent all of the
kinds of deprivations that inmates face. For example, inmates are deprived of both
material possessions as well as psychological stability. They are deprived of clothes they
want to wear and the food they want to eat. They are denied access to heterosexual
relationships, as well as, family and friends. Finally, they are deprived of freedom and of
any expectations of privacy. Deprivation shapes an inmate‟s adjustment to prison.
Inmates are being fully subjected to a unique prison environment with its strict regime,
11

discrimination, and interactions with other inmates and staff. As an outcome of remaining
in this “unique social environment,” inmates learn about its culture through everyday
experience (Clemmer as cited in Stevens, 1998 p. 189) and are considered to be “products
of their social interaction” (Stevens, 1998, p. 189). Proponents of deprivation theory
claim that this unique prison environment impacts an inmate‟s experience through the
prisonization effect regardless of preincarceration experiences (Stevens, 1998.) This all
may very well be true; however, the current research is interested in the development of
economic conflict in these depriving settings.
Importation Model
While Irwin and Cressey (1962) agreed upon the importance of deprivation
factors in explaining inmates‟ adjustment to prison, they also claimed that Sykes
overestimated these factors while playing down the crucial component of the analysis,
which is the unique characteristics of the inmates and the prior experience of these
individuals. Pre-prison socialization experiences of the inmate, according to Irwin and
Cressey (1962), are the foundation for the formation of prisoner subculture. Evidence was
found that supports the fact that those who used to live violent lives outside are more
likely to associate with other violent prisoners and often engage in similar behavior in the
facility. Therefore, Irwin and Cressey (1962) insist that leaving aside inmate prior
experience while studying inmate adjustment to the prison might lead to an overly
simplistic answer for a complex problem.
Taking into consideration both theories as a theoretical grounding we also have to
address the issues of individual needs of the prisoners. This will help to explain the
origins of economic conflict in the correctional facility.
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Maslow’s Theory
Maslow (1943) discovered that human actions are directed toward need
fulfillment. While moving towards the goal, individuals should satisfy particular needs,
such as physiological, safety, belonging to others, esteem, and self-actualization. These
needs exist in this hierarchy and can only be satisfied in incremental order; in other words
physiological needs will always come before growth needs and remain actual and
irreplaceable at any point of time. The prison environment is set up in a way to deprive
the individual, not only from achieving high goals, but also from satisfying basic needs,
such as the food they want to have, clothes they want to wear, the safe environment they
want to be in, and making decisions they want to make. However, by depriving persons
from freedom, autonomy, social identity, and capital accumulation, the state is able to
deprive individuals from legitimate possibilities to satisfy his or her basic needs.
However, the mere fact that needs can not be satisfied does not negate their existence
simply because these needs are internal characteristics of the individual and can not be
detached from the latter. Therefore, as long as these needs are not satisfied, the individual
will search for legitimate or illegitimate means to satisfy her needs.
Ecological Model
The question now is whether and how individuals in such a depriving
environment are still able to satisfy their needs. To answer this question we have to
introduce the ecological model, which was proposed by Toch and further developed by
Johnson (1997). According to the ecological model, the prison environment is not
uniform, but rather diverse and comprised of different types of niches. Inmates try to
adjust to prison life by finding the niches that best accommodate their needs. Niches are
functional subsettings that contains objects, accommodations, resources, people, and
relationships between them within a particular organized space (Seymour as cited in
13

Johnson, 1997). In an unstable and even violent prison culture, a niche usually guarantees
a safe existence and an avoidance of convict culture. Inmates adjust to prison through
finding the niches that will accommodate and best meet the unique combination of their
needs, and represent the best environmental fit for them. However, in real life, niches
have some limitations. First of all, a prison is like a free capitalist world that does not
guarantee a particular niche that an inmate is looking for. Secondly, a niche requires
allies which are inherently grounded on trust. Trust, in turn, is a rare entity in prison. As a
result, some prisoners may never find the niche that would be safe and comfortable for
them. “One man‟s niche can be another man‟s nightmare” (Johnson, 1997, p.172).
So far it has been found that individuals who enter the confinement stage of the
criminal justice process are subject to severe limitations and deprivations regarding
access to means of production and resources. These individuals, while possessing
particular private characteristics, must assimilate in a harsh world of prison which is
called prison culture. To minimize victimization as well as to better satisfy their needs,
individuals affiliate with niches (Johnson, 1997). In order for this model to become more
utilitarian, economic relationships between subjects should be added.
Principles of Economic Exchange in the Prison
For the purpose of our study, we examine the prison from the micro theoretical
perspective. Implementing a closer analysis of the prison as a monolithic,
multidimensional and comparatively autonomous entity, it is clear that forces that are so
embedded in our everyday culture also take place in the correctional institutions, and
have no less impact on the latter. We will concentrate our attention on prison itself and its
internal dynamics. First of all, we have found that the prison economy takes the form of
two almost independent but exhaustive systems.
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The first model is a formal economic system that is comprised of legitimate
exchanges of goods and services. This system is in essence a socialist economy with a
state, or more precisely, a business entity (prison industrial complex) ownership of the
means of production. The production, distribution, or selling of goods and services occurs
for direct use, speculation and accumulation of capital. The demand exists only within a
particular institution, while the supply is not limited to the facility, town, state, or even
country. All commodities that circulate inside the facility have to be paid for. However,
the price is not an outcome of the conjunction of demand and supply. The seller is a
business entity that has a monopolized market power and is able to determine and
regulate the price.
Another system is an informal economic system that is comprised of both, licit
and illicit exchanges of goods and services. It is an open market economy or free-market
capitalism. The means of production are privately owned by prisoners. The latter
produce, distribute, or resell goods and services for profit. The conjunction of demand
and supply under the condition of competition and cultural consumption norms
determines the price of goods and services. However, because U. S. currency is
considered to be contraband inside the facility, and therefore prohibited, price does not
take the form of financial commodities. Instead each prison has its own currency that
usually takes the form of a durable, portable, and highly demanded commodity that can
be comparatively easily obtained. According to Lankenau (2001), for decades cigarettes
were this commodity. However, with the restrictions and even smoking prohibition in the
majority of penal institutions, cigarettes could not fulfill the role of currency anymore.
Today fairly inexpensive commissary items play the role of prison medium of exchange.
The prison economy, just like the real world one, does not exist in a pure form. Stringent
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regulations and barriers are created by the prison staff, whose work is highly oriented
toward eliminating, regulating or even participating in any illegal activity in the facility.
The formal prison economy provides, at best, the essentials, while at worst, even
less. “It is true that the prisoner‟s basic material needs are met- in the sense that he does
not go hungry, cold or wet” (Sykes, 1971. p.65). However, Sykes continues, prisoners
need not only necessities, but also amenities such as different goods and services, the
number of which is very limited. Finally, the formal system provides very little
opportunity to earn income, and if it does there is no fairness in the distribution of income
(Lankenau, 2001). This reality ultimately gives birth to an informal economy “that is
premised on consuming prohibited or contraband items and hustles.” (Gleason as cited in
Lankenau, p. 143.) The possibility of a black market existence and it‟s power to survive
depends upon the relationships between those who are willing to obtain a commodity and
individuals with access to an illegal commodity in unsecured sections of the prison as
well as the areas outside the facility (Lankenau, 2001).
It is important to mention that the mere existence of an informal prison economy
does not necessarily imply inmate economic conflict. The informal economy undoubtedly
may precipitate the conflict. Meanwhile, the economic conflict is shaped by structural
and cultural forces that penetrate both the open and the underground economy.
Structural forces influence the development of a black market and therefore
precipitate the economic conflict. The age of the facility is one of the most important
forces. Age in turn usually determines the design of the prison. More contemporary
prisons are known for better security and easier supervision, which limits the scope and
even the possibility of the conflict. Another factor is the degree to which inmates are
allowed to move within and outside the facility. Finally, lack of staff training, and lack of
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their diligence to create a safer and more trustworthy environment, will enhance the
possibility of conflict.
Cultural forces also precipitate the conflict. Today‟s late modern society is very
inclusive. It puts intense pressure on individuals to conform, to become included in the
mainstream of the vogue, to remain included, to have commodities, and to wear and
possess the right things. Society itself is digesting people. Many of us inculcate ourselves
with all the desires and passions for consumerism. We can assume that the majority of
prisoners used to live their life on the streets and socialize within this particular popular
culture. They aspired to be included and to be part of this culture. Therefore, taking this
notion and applying it in Irwin‟s and Cressy‟s (1962) importation theory, it is not
surprising that this popular subculture of consumerism is being brought to the depriving
environment of the prison. Female inmates aspire to conform and to be included
regardless of what environment they are in. Even being locked up in the facility, they
strive to achieve what today constitutes being a beautiful woman. There is no doubt that
some people in the “free world” would consider jail-issue clothing, cosmetics, deodorant
and other grooming items as an inmate‟s unstipulated caprices. I am not critiquing that
because it may very well be true. However, this attitude masks the tremendous cultural
force that exist in contemporary society and that makes people conform to particular
norms.
It is culture that shapes individuals from the first until the last days of their lives
and teaches us that females must use soap, deodorant, shaving razors, shampoo, etc. This
is a culture that promotes consumerism as a unique technique to construct identity and
promote it as a requisite for a successful life. Therefore, like females in the community,
women in prison fully possess this ingrained notion of culture. That is why it is much
more important to the majority of women to have the clothes they can wear in prison, to
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have the cosmetics and hygiene products they can possess, and finally to have food so
they can follow the standards of beauty and femininity.
Prison in turn is stripping identity from the women inmates (Goffman, 1961). As
a result, a tension arises between imported culture of consumerism on the one hand, and
depriving nature of prison and identity stripping on the other.
The majority of prisons allow females to have cosmetics and other products as
long as they can obtain them through legitimate means. However, simply because very
few prisoners have resources to purchase these products, these items are in high demand
and low supply. This fact gives birth to a hierarchy among inmates and to the birth of a
black market and all kinds of deviance associated with it. It occurs because our cultural
fabric has become so powerful, and our identity has been shaped around certain
commodities. Therefore, when we cannot attain things that are desired, it may cause
conflict. This conflict is nonetheless the outcome of culture. Our society excludes those
who can not afford to be included. It regurgitates, spits out, and keeps a distance from
those people who can not attain it. Therefore, impoverished and deprived women are
willing to sacrifice the most sacred of what they have, their femininity and sexuality to
obtain things and to feel included.
Sexual relationships are one of the most obvious and probably the most common
forms of inmate desire to restore balance. Findings indicate that in prison, sexual
relationships are ground primarily on manipulation rather than on any perception of
homosexual alliance (Greer, 2000.) That is, inmates participate in sexual relationships in
order to improve economic standing. The economic standing here is also directly
associated with power relations. The Marxist claim that the notion of power exists in
relation to the modes of production is highly applicable to modern prisons. Greer (2000)
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found that prisoners are perceived as being more influential if they have higher monetary
support compared to others.
In contrast to Marx (1976) and Weber‟s (1978) conceptions of power are
different. For Weber, power is not only attached to economic class, but it is also about
social status. These two may operate together but they are relatively independent. Power,
according to Weber, is a social actor‟s capability to require people to do certain things
that they would not do otherwise. Social status is the degree to which a person is
perceived by others as possessing socially valued attributes. This is the degree to which
this person has social status. In deprived settings such as prisons, entities such as
economic power and social status are so closely intertwined that they intensify cultural
and structural disparities among inmates. Moreover, the constitutive lack of material
goods as well the limits of sources of income, predetermines the development of both
economic power and social status. Therefore, the form in which economic relations exist
in prison is defined by economic power and by social prestige, or social status.
Continuing with economic relationships, it was already constituted that the
satisfaction of inmates‟ needs and gaining social status requires involvement in black
market activity. Inmates, being rational human beings, certainly are fully aware of the
prohibition of the black market and any hustling activity in the facilities. However, their
desire to gain access to extra material goods and services is a violation of rationality.
Someone would call this the emotionality of a human being. However, I want to redefine
and clarify the term emotionality. I do not consider an inmate‟s involvement into hustling
activity for the purpose of getting extra goods and services as emotionality. Instead, I
define prisoner‟s emotionality as their response to irrationality of the prison setting and
prison management. During visits to facilities, Dr. Wells noticed that the general
response of the staff to conflict is to put both adversarial parties in segregation or to
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utilize different kinds of sanctions against them (Dr. Wells, personal communication
November, 12, 2012).
Contemporary prison is a highly flowing, rationalized and bureaucratic agency in
the way prison authorities exercise their power. Therefore it is obvious why authorities
respond to the problem through bureaucratic means; a structured, rationalized, and
predictable response is simply better suited for control and management. However, what
is questionable is how our culture through mentalities and sensibilities shapes this kind of
response. When inmates go to segregation, or when they face restrictive commissary
privileges or more frequent cell searches, our mentalities and sensibilities accept this type
of punishment as rational and deserving. It is indeed common sense for both officers and
the general public to punish prisoners for any rule violation. It is presumed that
punishment would serve as a deterrent from any violations in future. In the praxis of
hegemony, inmates are rational creatures and choose to violate the prison rules. Therefore
they deserve to be punished in a rationalistic way- a way that conforms to rationalistic
sentiments. This idea, as rational as it is, leads society to not question the grounds of
inmates‟ cultural adaptations in the first place. If they deserve to be punished, and this is
the way we have always done it, why would anyone even question something that is
already common sense? This practice of punishment reaffirms the normative way of
thinking about inmates and their misbehavior. This type of system response, therefore,
reaffirms popular culture, reshapes it and contributes to hegemony.
However, this type of system response is very inconvenient for inmates. Being
already in a deprived setting, it gets even harder for them to retain their individual
identities. Therefore, a prisoner‟s natural response to authorities is to adapt to prison
culture through rebellion, which is engaging in illegal activities and hustling.
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Guards often escalate the problem. Poorly paid and often lacking of ethics, the
officers may take advantage of deprived inmates and the miserable condition of the
prison. Therefore, motivated by multiple rational factors, officers might smuggle coffee,
cigarettes, drugs and other commodities to prison. By smuggling or helping the
smuggling of illegal goods into a facility, correctional officers directly fuel the prison
economy. Corrupt officers not only encourage deviance in the prison community, but
they also reduce the independence and effectiveness of other officers by weakening social
bonds and decomposing discipline. Finally they drastically drop society‟s perception of
the correctional officers‟ image, dignity and respect.
To conclude, the environment of incarceration is notorious for the deprivation and
limitation of freedom and other liberties, so neither material possessions nor outside
status can be fully brought to the facility. Wealth and status are the major notions in the
facility. Prison conditions inevitably contribute to the economic conflict in the facility.
Deprivation precipitates the economic conflict. As we know “no one does anything for
nothing in prison”; and all pleas to bring in “just a bit tobacco” or “make just one phone
call” were refused‟ (Crewe, 2006, p.351). Prison life is inherently mantled with a lot of
temptations such as choosing the path of gambling, hustling, and other illegal activities.
On the other hand, it is hard to deny that certain individual characteristics may
significantly affect an inmate‟s behavior during imprisonment, which can also lead to
tensions and conflicts (Steiner & Wooldredge, 2009). Age, level of education, or criminal
history are among the obvious ones. The same economic conflict may originate from the
pre-prison class and material inequalities. Those inmates who receive money from family
and friends may be able to afford buying certain things while confined. However, those
without money are forced to get involved in illegal activities. However, gambling or
selling contraband items may result in unequal distribution of wealth, which in turn may
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lead to physical and other types of violence or prohibited behavior (i.e., threats, stealing
or extortion).
Women in Prison
For many decades women comprised only a small fraction of the total prison
population. As a result, there are far fewer institutions for women than for men. Women
also serve their time in the institutions that much smaller those for men (Pollock, 1990).
For all of the above stated reasons, there has not been a lot of academic and practitioner
attention concerning the needs of incarcerated women. Only the exponential increase in
the number of female prisoners behind bars has brought a substantial amount of attention
to the problem. The inconvenient and unaccommodating environment of women‟s
prisons has been research topic for the last several decades. With the contributions of
Giallombardo (1966), Kruttschnitt (1983), Owen (1998), Pollock (1990), Ward and
Kassebaum (1965), and others, we have discovered the reality of women‟s life and its
implications while confined. However, a number of questions remain. One of the
questions that took my imminent interest was prison economic relations and economic
victimization of women‟s prisoners. Early classic literature revealed the scope of the
problem as well the origin and factors that contribute to economic conflict. However, the
majority of the literature was dated 2004 and earlier. I was unable to find any research
post 2004 that pertained to inmate economic conflict as the object of study. Ironically,
some contemporary books on prison victimization do not even acknowledge this type of
conflict.
This chapter summaries the major findings of economic conflict phenomenon in
both male and female penal institutions during the period of 1930 to the present. I will
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show how broader cultural, economic and political forces shape institutional life and have
a potential to influence economic conflict. I will also unmantle the drastic gender
differences within confined populations and stress what it means to be a female prisoner
under the current correctional policies.
Early Studies on Prison Economic Victimization
One of the earliest discussions about economic conflict was found in classic
sociological study by Donald Clemmer that took place during the mid-1930s. Clemmer
(1958) recognized that inmate economic relations exist and flourish against the
background of the inmate code. He pointed out that “There ain‟t no ten commandmentsin prison” (p.154). However, he stressed that with certain exceptions inmates usually
follow common rules from the code. For example, the code stated that a prisoner should
not steal from another prisoner. However, from careful observation Clemmer (1958)
concluded that some prisoners are not strong enough to completely follow the inmate
code without violations. Therefore, though the code imposes that stealing from the state
is totally appropriate, these items should only be given away, and not sold for profit.
Prisoners often violate this condition. “Food is stolen from the kitchen and sold; clothes
and shoes are sold and a favor is usually considered worth a small fee” (Clemmer, 1958,
p. 160).
Other forms of profit activity also took place in the penitentiary in which
Clemmer undertook his research. He found that the carriers who smuggled alcohol into
prison had pure financial motives. The amount of alcohol which cost one dollar in the
free world will bring four times more inside the penitentiary. Though Clemmer (1958)
was not convinced that the smuggling was widespread, he affirmed the real scope of the
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activity was unknown. Clemmer (1958) did not identify any social pattern within inmate
economic relationships and was convinced that economic victimization was no more than
an isolated individual act.
Clemmer‟s study became the first in a long series of sociological studies of
prisons. A classic study was accomplished in a maximum security prison in the mid
1950s by Gresham Sykes. It was a descriptive study of prison as a social system that
revealed prison life as a multidimensional entity. Sykes (1971) identified a number of
social roles in prison and consequently was able to uncover social patterns that drive
inmate economic relations. Alongside the direct use of force and coercion, Sykes found
that certain prisoners use psychological and economic manipulation to obtain desirable
outcomes. Because manipulation is a subtle form of exploitation, fellow inmates usually
do not feel any coercion or threat of violence and comply voluntarily. Manipulative
techniques often take the form of fraud and chicanery and may include, but are not
limited to, defaulting one's obligations, cheating on gambling debts, and selling
communal property.
Some of the patterns of inmate economic behavior discovered by Sykes (1971)
remained unchanged since early Clemmer‟s study. For example, prisoners despised those
who sell what is only supposed to be given away. Inmates who violated the inmate code
by placing their own prosperity above the prosperity of the other inmates are called
merchants. “The man stealing stuff from the institution is stealing from me. He shouldn‟t
try and sell it to me” (Sykes, 1971, p.94). While merchant‟s actions are not accompanied
by coercion, their behavior is subversive and exploitative. However, as mentioned in
Chapter 1, the black market economy in prison is a capitalist economy in which the
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aforesaid actions are totally appropriate. Therefore, just like in the real world, in prison
those inmates who are willing to betray solidarity and collaboration, victimize fellow
inmates, get involved in speculative activities, and are willing to take risks, are the
inmates who have a chance to escape from material deprivation and prosper.
Regardless of how cynical one inmate‟s actions might be toward other inmates,
the prison environment is an inherently cruel and embittered reality in which
victimization and degradation are common notions. In 1980, Bowker accomplished a
fundamental contemporary study on prison victimization. He insisted that prisoners are
hardly in the position to control their destiny. They are assigned to a particular institution
and a classified unit. In that unit they will learn that “Prison is a barely controlled jungle
where the aggressive and the strong will exploit the weak and the weak are dreadfully
aware of it” (Keve, 1974 as cited in Bowker, 1980, p.19). This exploitation escalates in
four different types of prison victimization: economic, physical, physiological, and social.
In liaison with the topic of the present study, I will closely examine economic
victimization, while the other types will be mentioned within the context of the present
work.
Economic conflict among inmates was recognized as soon as the first penal
institutions appeared. To the present day, penal professionals are able to distinguish eight
diverse but interrelated kinds of economic victimization. These include loansharking,
gambling frauds, theft, robbery, protection rackets, and deliberate misrepresentation of
products. Though these types of economic victimization are very common in male
prisons, women economic victimization takes different forms among women prisoners
and will be discussed later.
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Deprivation and Importation
Like any social institution, prison is well-known for its unique culture, mores and
norms that have evolved and advanced historically. On the other hand, individuals who
come to prison introduce a number of unique personal characteristics into the solid and
tough prison culture. This confrontation of different individual and institution cultures,
which are often adversarial, led to the ongoing search as to how inmates really adjust to
prison. Two models which emphasize importation and deprivation, respectively, have the
most importance for our analysis.
The study “Thieves, Convicts and the Inmate Culture” by Irwin and Cressey
(1962) presented an outstanding qualitative study that shed light on the inmate subculture
both within and outside the facility. Irwin and Cressey (1962) were able to identify
different types of inmate subcultures and explain how particular inmates oriented to
particular subcultures while “doing” their time. Stressing the importance of importation
theory (which focuses on inmate prior experience and outside conditions), the authors
were able to explain the true roots of economic conflict in correctional facilities and show
how this conflict may be overcome using status, power and conformity to particular
deviant subcultures. According to Irwin and Cressey (1962), a clerk can work in a kitchen
storeroom and steal and sell food to acquire status. So there is a number of available
opportunities to work in the facilities. The jobs differ from transporting contraband to
doing laundry, or from drawing tattoos to gambling and taking bets. Each job is paid, so
it is highly desirable. When Irwin and Cressy made their analyses, cigarettes were widely
spread in prison. Therefore they found that a steady income of cigarettes, which was the
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medium of exchange in prison, can assert prisoners to a level of influence that will allow
them to purchase symbols of status to separate them from the others.
While Irwin and Cressy (1962) did not ignore deprivation factors, they stressed
pre-prison individual factors as those which to a large degree shape prison experience.
Other literature suggests that in some instances, the deprivation model can play the most
important part in understanding depression, self-harm, and irritability (Slotboom et al.,
2011). Interestingly, Zingraff (1980) detected that in the case of male inmates,
deprivation factors play the most important role in prisonization phenomena. However,
female prisonization is equally influenced by both deprivation and importation factors.
This is just one indication that men and women adjust and do time in prison differently.
Female Prisoners
Female inmates serve their time differently. Prison is a place where gender
differences become critically important. “The men have everything. They stick together.
The women are afraid” (Owen, 1998, p.73). Incarcerated women face unique issues, such
as healthcare, family and children care, and no access to equal rights. Researchers have
examined the demographic characteristics of female prisoners, the social world of
women‟s prisons and women‟s adaptations to confinement (Heffernan, 1972; Jones,
1993, Owen, 1998, Pollock, 1990).
Women envision incarceration as a very unusual experience that may not be
excessively difficult physically, but very stressful emotionally (Stevens, 1998.) Fear of
the unknown in conjunction with breaking ties with children and families, as well as lack
of emotional support and loss of financial assets, shape the behavior and habits women
are going to experience in prison.
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One of the major characteristics of women‟s prison is that these institutions
confine a disproportionate number of minorities and poor (Pollock, 1990). This fact has a
direct impact on women‟s economic relationships while confined. Like their male
counterparts, female inmates strive to improve their material conditions. However,
coming from a low income environment, many women have little or no outside support.
Options to earn money in prison are also very limited. The only way to acquire legitimate
or contraband goods and services is to exploit the environment (Giallombardo, 1966) “If
you can get a little racket going, more power to you” (Giallombardo, 1966, p. 121).
Therefore the “merchant” behavior that is despised in male prison (i.e., stealing from the
institution) is more appropriate in women‟s prisons. Stealing from the institution is
justified by the following rationale “If you don‟t get there first, someone else will”
(Giallombardo, 1966, p. 121).
Another significant factor that makes a prison a place where gender differences
become critically important pertains to the cultural conception of femininity in
contemporary American society. There is abundance of rules that recently have been
implemented in county jails. These rules include, but are not limited to, no makeup or
jewelry permitted, no access to personal property, such as curling irons or hair dryers,
and no usage of bleaches in the laundry. These rules, while technically applying to both
sexes, in reality, will affect only women (Jackson & Stearns, 1995). Therefore, clear
discrepancies exist between identities that are being constructed through social
interactions and between policies that significantly deprive women from the tools and
means to achieve this appearance of women in American society. These discrepancies
escalate with another major trend in policies. Efforts to promote rationalization and
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standardization as well as gender equity in corrections often force women to adapt to
prison in the conventional “masculine” style (Gartner & Kruttschnitt, 2004).
Women‟s prisons are considered to be safer than those for men. Bowker (1980)
stressed that both male and female institutions are known for violence and degradation.
The only distinction is in “degrees rather than in kind” (p. 54). Violence among females
is less prevalent, whereas, the instances when it occurs may be notable for severity,
viciousness, and harshness. However, later studies of women‟s prisons (e.g., Owen, 1998,
Pollock, 2002) revealed that the violence, gangs, and racial tensions that are so common
in the male institutions, are unusual in the women‟s prisons.
Research indicates that, in general, violence is not the way to take care of things
among female inmates, and it usually serves to achieve dominance and subordination
when other manipulative strategies fail to achieve their goal. Therefore, techniques of
social control other than violence and exploitation are sufficient enough to maintain and
control the social structure in female correctional institutions.
Interestingly, those scholars are united when talking about the manipulative and
speculative nature of female inmates. Goffman (1961) describes manipulative practices
or “secondary adjustments” as prisoner‟s attempts to obtain prohibited satisfactions or to
secure legitimate ones by illicit means. Involving into these practices as well as profiting
from them alleviates the misery, deprivation and loneliness of prison life.
Economic Victimization in Women’s Prison
After an extensive review of the literature, I found that most researchers on prison
victimization, except Williams and Fish (1974), tend to see inmate economic conflict as
originating in the inmate code, conditions of confinement, or prison violence.
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Researchers often do not link the prison economic system with the wider imported
culture that makes poverty to be appropriate and even a necessary condition of
incarceration. “Poverty is a fringe punishment” (Williams & Fish, 1974, p.9). This
attitude justifies and intensifies the severe limitations of the prison formal economic
system, and hence results in inmate struggling and involvement in a sub rosa economy.
Economic conflict has been substantially addressed by researchers in high
security male correctional facilities; stringent control and regimentation of the latter leads
to a well developed and defined inmate culture with a prosper illicit economy that
perpetrates it (Williams & Fish, 1974). Less secure female prisons do not tend to develop
a powerful inmate culture; therefore these institutions are less susceptible to a strong sub
rosa economy. This might account for the lack of research on women economic
victimization. Also when it comes to female prisons, lesbianism has been the main
research topic for the last several decades.
However, even the limited existing research on women‟s prisons is consistent
with the exploitative relations of a confined community. Owen (1998) revealed there are
three categories of exploitative relationships: theft, borrowing without intent to return,
and inability to pay loan or return goods to the owner. This last type of nonpayment not
only hurts and economically deprives the initial owner of the resource, but also disrupts
trust between prisoners. “…I told her not to loan things to people” (Owen, 1998, p.149).
The second category involves interpersonal relations which include emotional
exploitation augmented by economics. In other words it is a phenomena which classic
literature calls “mating for commissary reasons” (Giallombardo, 1966, p.125; Williams &
Fish, 1974, p. 113). Owen et al. (2008) found instances where women with a sufficient
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amount of resources would exploit those without resources for friendship and devotion.
Other instances occur when inmates without resources target rich women and coerce
them to enter into relationships to get access to their possessions and commissary (Greer,
2000; Owen et al., 2008).
Though pervasive homosexuality is indeed a characteristic of adult female
prisons, some research indicates that it is a rare occasion when women inmates are forced
into homosexual relationships by physical aggression and against their will. Most of the
prison sexual relationships between inmates are consensual (Girschick, 1999;
Kruttschnitt, 1983; Owen, 1998; Pollock, 2002 ). The third category of exploitation
involves extortion which usually occurs when weak inmates are pressured to give away
their possessions to another prisoner through demands or exploitative personal
relationships. Owen (1998) described an inmate‟s mindset “If I want those earrings, I
would say, “hey, I want those earrings.” If she said no, I would take them anyways”
(p.151). There is also enough evidence that vulnerable and marginalized women had to
“buy their way out” in order to avoid trouble.
According to Greer (2000), women in prison are striving to reconstruct a
“substitutive universe” (p. 453) to overcome the loss of roles they perform in the real
world. However, they do not tend to construct any close, trustful, long-lasting
relationships. Even the involvement into interpersonal relationships based on the concept
of romance is erroneous in modern correctional institutions. Economic manipulation such
as access to money or material goods was found to be a primary motivation for engaging
in homosexual affairs (Greer, 2000, Ward & Kassebaum, 1965).
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Casella (2000), while studying a sexual economy among nineteenth- century
Australian female convict prisoners, found that circulation of material object exchange
and well as sexual encounters, flourishing networks of the black market economy.
Availability of essential resources and diverting luxuries as valuable exchange items was
possible through careful trafficking. „The “tobacco and pipes and…a bottle of rum”…to
be sent “in some way so as it cannot be seen” ‟ (Daniels as cited in Casella, 2000, p.218).
Researchers who study contemporary women‟s prisons, to the contrary, have
failed to find an extensive black market or economic victimization (Bowker, 1980) At
least they claim that the black market operates at the same level as identified in prisons
for men (Pollock, 1990). The degree of organization of the black market seems to be
more loose and informal in female prisons compared to their male counterparts. Drugs
and other contraband are being distributed within the facility, but the distribution occurs
in rather informal circles.
The deprivation setting of the prison, in conjunction with material scarcity,
increases not only a drug‟s value, but also the subjective value of common, nonexpensive goods. Basic items such as candies and soda are among the goods, which when
stolen or taken away by force, escalate into inmate economic conflict and contribute to
the diminished perception of safety among inmates. Aforesaid challenges have a potential
to escalate into more serious forms of violence.
Economic Victimization from Staff
Just as there is a lack of the literature on female economic victimization, very
little is known about staff- prisoner victimization in female correctional institutions.
Guenther (1975) tends to originate this victimization within the “struggle for dominance”
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(p.249) between correctional officers and inmates. Moreover, he pointed out that both
sides have their unique resources to succeed. Custodial staff often has the ability to
receive information prior or during the occurrence of undesirable activity; therefore the
element of surprise is among their advantages. Among all other resources, prisoners have
the invaluable one, which is time. Idle inmates will find a way to compile and accomplish
desirable activity. Prisoners also have tactics of bringing and keeping contraband: they
have stashes, accomplices, and in some occasions, they have the patronage of corrupt
staff members. Guenther (1975) indicated that even if custodial staff finishes their most
productive search, they will uncover only a small fraction of contraband circulating at the
time.
Taking into consideration all prisoners‟ unique resources, it is evident that there is
a major condition that drives a distinction between prison officials and confined inmates.
This condition is the possession of prison‟s officials exclusive privilege on the legitimate
means of coercion and use of force (Sykes, 1958). This condition suppresses the equality
of the distribution of resources, favors and ultimately power.
I perceive that Guenther‟s (1975) call “struggle for dominance” (p. 249) between
staff and inmates is only “illusion, created between those with power, and those without”
(Berman & The Wachowski Brothers, 2003). The victimization of prisoners occurs
because of unequal distribution of power, and the victimization of prisoners by staff
cannot be easily separated from rightful application of institutional policies by custodial
staff (Bowker, 1980).
Interestingly, researchers, while describing sexual relationships between inmates
and staff, refer to these relationships as relatively consentual (Bothworth, 1999; Genders
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& Player, 1990; Giallombaro, 1966; Girshick, 1999; Heffernan, 1972; Owen, 1998;
Rierden, 1997; Ward & Kassebaum, 1965;). The rationality behind this statement is that
women seek particular favors from male officers in exchange to sexual attentions,
therefore women are willing participants. This concurrence, in turn, does not seem to be
plausible once we realize that first of all female who are in custody and, secondly,
deprived of legitimate means to gain any needs, freedoms, or privileges (Pollock, 1990).
Visiting different correctional institutions while completing other research, I was
extremely pleased to observe posters with “It can never be consensual”. Unfortunately,
reality is a little different. Women engage in intimate relationships for different reasons,
the majority of which are economic in nature. Therefore, as long as economic deprivation
remains relatively high, the true reasons for such behavior will remain more subsistent
than ever.
Changes over Time
So far I have tried to provide an exhaustive literature review on prison economic
conflict and other forms of victimization, as well explain how the female role fits the
social structure of the prison and perpetrates conflict. I have also stressed that there is not
much literature on economic conflict among female inmates.
Now I would like to show that prison culture and conflict are not stable and
monolithic entities. To the contrary, the social structure and conditions of prison are
changing over time and these changes are ongoing. Research has shown that the
experiences and adaptations of prisoners are not constant over time (Diaz-Cotto, 1996;
Greer, 2000; Mandaraka-Sheppard, 1986; Rierden, 1997). The inmate‟s perception of
prison reality alters alongside the shifts within the larger society. In other words, the
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prison subculture is being influenced by broader political, cultural, economic and social
forces changes. (Clemmer, 1950; Jacobs, 1977; Sykes, 1971). Research suggests that
culture in women prisons, which for decades has been less violent and less victimizing
than the men‟s subculture, might be changing toward more coercion and victimization
(Greer, 2000). Fox (as cited in Gartner & Kruttschnitt, 2004) found that the punitive shift
in criminal justice in the 1980s, in tandem with the prisoners‟ rights and feminist
movements, created the new type of prisoners: politicized and litigious. Continuing, Fox
(as cited in Gartner & Kruttschnitt, 2004, p. 269) mentioned that “What was once
approximately characterized as a cooperative and caring community…has slowly evolved
into more dangerous and competitive prison social climate.”
Gartner and Kruttschnitt (2004) found evidence that broader social and economic
changes had shaped prison economic relationships. Comparing prison economic
relationships in the 1960s with those in the 1990s, they found that by 1990 there was a
reduction of the personal property exchange among prisoners because of the potential for
conflict. “If you loan something, it‟s hard for you to get it back. And the next thing you
know, you‟re gonna boxin‟ for it,” claimed a young Black female (Gartner &
Kruttschnitt, 2004, p. 293). Gartner and Kruttschnitt (2004) continue that in such an
environment a lot of violence is taking place over foolish things, like owing a pack of
cigarettes.
Another example of changes within inmate culture and prison economies was
presented in 2001 by Lankenau. He argues that the cigarette- smoking prohibition
policies have transformed the fairly bening cigarette “gray market” where cigarettes were
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once used as the major currency, into a highly regulated “black market” where cigarettes
are an excessively prized contraband commodity.
Safe Environment
Interestingly, some research has found that prison can be a relatively safe
environment, especially in regard to the lumpenproletariat class. Gaining resources and
income through legitimate practices may be an infeasible task for socially marginalized
women. That is why engaging in illegal activities can be seen as the only accessible and
worthwhile task. Prison in turn, constitutes a “safe haven” from violence, indigence,
discrimination and other circumscriptive social issues (Bradley & Davino, 2002; Richie,
1996). This finding is based on the fact that many women inmates were victims of child
and adult physical and sexual abuse (Bradley & Davino, 2002). Bradley and Davino
(2002), upon completion of their qualitative analyses, once stressed that taking into
consideration an inmate‟s background, some prisoners perceived confinement to be much
safer that the preincarceration environment.
Conclusion
Understanding the nature of inmate economic conflict was not universal
throughout the twentieth century. While the first research on prison victimization did not
even identify social patterns within inmate economic relationships, later studies found
that economic victimization was more than an isolated individual act. Economic conflict
is tightly connected to other problems in housing units (i.e., physical and sexual violence,
inmate- staff relationships, and successfulness of institutional procedures in protecting
female inmates).
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With the exponential growth of the female population in jails and prisons since
1980s, researchers were able to acknowledge that gender makes an unprecedented
difference when it comes to adjustment to the prison culture, and perception of safety and
victimization. Slotboom et al. (2011), concluded that deprivation is perceived differently
by female inmates. Very often deprivation is contingent on an individual‟s perception.
While perception is not necessarily reality, it can be more important than reality in
directing behavior. For example, women who perceive their environment as stressful or
unsafe, who feel depressed and excluded, are more likely to have psychological
complaints during incarceration (Slotboom et al., 2011).
While researches extensively studied prison culture from the sociological and
psychological perspectives, the prison economy, especially the informal part of it, has
escaped the careful examination of most researchers and practitioners. This might have
occurred for the following reasons: economic conflict is not usually perceived as violence
per se, therefore it does not require immediate attention; secondly, most sociologists and
psychologists have received little training and have less interest in economic theory as
compared to sociological studies.
The social structure and conditions of prison are changing over time. There are
different reasons that account for that. Prison as a social institution is heavily influenced
by broader political, cultural, economic and social forces. Therefore, changes that
occurred in different spheres will be reflected on prison life. Punitive political ideology
towards criminal justice offenders that originated in the 1980s has drastically changed the
portrait and the characteristics of the prisoner. The major cultural shift in individual
perception of safety brought major changes in the way we define crime, as well as, in the
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way we prosecute and punish crime. Taken together, these changes influence the
environment and ideology inside the facility, which undoubtedly shapes security, safety
and victimization.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY

The previous two chapters have revealed that, historically, inmate economic
conflict is more or less relevant to every female correctional facility. However, because
female inmate economic conflict itself does not represent violence per se, it has been
largely neglected and has yielded to studies of more serious forms of conflict. Also, the
fairly small percentage of incarcerated women, when compared to men, may account for
the lack of research on this topic.
The widespread number of women prisons across the country makes it almost
impossible to obtain a large enough random sample for a particular study. This study uses
a purposeful sample of prisons as well as a purposeful sample of incarcerated female
inmates inside the chosen prisons. The sample is sufficient enough to allow exhaustive
analysis of factors that might account for the economic victimization in women‟s prisons.
This chapter describes the research methods used while conducting this study, as well as
provides an overview of the research design, research setting and population from which
the sample was drawn. I will also present information regarding sampling procedures,
variables, instrumentation, and preliminary data analyses.
Research Design
The present study is primarily based on quantitative research methods including
descriptive statistics and hierarchical linear modeling. Descriptive statistics including
frequencies, means, and standard deviations were calculated for all relevant variables.
The analyses were performed using SPSS version 18 and Mplus version 6.2.
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Prior to conducting the advanced data analyses, we screened the survey data and
made an important discovery. Since most of the female inmates live in group housing
units as opposed to individual cells, they share common environment and experiences.
Given that the survey respondents were clustered or nested within 80 housing units, our
observations regarding their perceptions of conflict are not considered to be independent,
but rather, are clustered within housing units. That is, women who live in the same
housing units are likely to have some common or shared perceptions. The phenomenon of
non independence of observations is called nested data. Conventional factor analyses and
hierarchical multiple regression do not take the nesting of the data into account.
However, failure to address the nesting of the data may lead to incorrect or not valid
conclusions (Wells, Owen, & Parson, 2013). Mirjam, Gerard, and Martijin (2003)
demonstrated that standard multiple regression and fixed effects regression usually
underestimate the standard error of inmate perceptions, and therefore, lead to incorrect
results (generally type I error) and incorrect confidence intervals (usually too narrow). To
overcome such inaccuracy, we utilized a statistical technique known as hierarchical linear
modeling or multilevel regression. The latter treats inmates as the unit of analysis, while
also taking into account the connection between the outcomes of inmates nested within
the same housing unit. (Mirjam et al., 2003). The analysis was performed using Mplus
version 6.12.
Source of Data
The instrument and the data were derived from a study supported by the National
Institute of Justice NIJ Award #2006-RP-BX-0016, Research on Violent Behavior and
Sexual Violence in Corrections 2006 accomplished by Owen, Wells, Pollock, Muscat,
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and Torres (2008). This instrument was further developed, refined and validated by Wells
et al. (2013) as part of the follow up study which was supported by National Institute of
Corrections (NIC) Award #10PEI34GKB6 PREA Validation Project for Improving
Safety in Women‟s Facilities.
For the present study, I am using these validated survey data as a secondary data
source. I chose this dataset because it best matches the variables I planned to utilize in
order to answer my research questions.
Population and Sample
The population from which the sample was drawn consisted of all women who
currently serve their sentence in local, state and federal jails and prisons throughout the
United States. Opportunities to draw a random sample were limited due to the extreme
dissemination of the correctional facilities all over the country. Therefore, the sample was
purposeful in nature. However, the sample contains a wide a variety of institutions:
county jails and state and federal prisons; big and small facilities, as well as, public and
private institutions. The sample also contains women from all possible housing units:
general population, low and high custody units, individual cells, isolation, and
administrative segregation, and infirmary. Therefore, although the sample is not strictly
representative of the population, the diversity of the facilities and their inmates allow us
to assume that characteristics of the sample are close to the characteristics of the female
prisoners in the United States. In total, 15 different facilities were visited in which 3,499
women inmates were surveyed. The overall response rate was 89.0%, while response
rates for individual housing units ranged from 50.0% to 100% (Wells et al., 2013).
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Instrumentation
In response to the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 (PREA), and based on
previous research conducted for the NIJ, Owen et al. (2008) developed the pilot version
of the Women‟s Correctional Safety Scales (WCSS). The WCSS is a comprehensive
battery of survey instruments developed to assess prisoner perceptions of safety and
violence in women‟s facilities. The battery of instruments was initially constructed and
validated based on the focus group data collected in the NIJ funded research. Upon
development of the instrument, readability and grade level were also assessed. The
current version of survey and consent form does not exceed the 9th grade level.
In 2013 Wells et al. (2013), sponsored by the NIC, further developed the
instrument. Using various methodologies, such as exploratory factor analyses, multilevel
factor analyses, regression analyses and other extensive statistical technics, the
researchers refined, shortened and validated the WCSS. They also addressed the problem
associated with the nested data by using multi-level confirmatory factor analysis
(MCFA), a procedure not yet common in criminal justice research. The end product was
a valid, reliable, and “user friendly” battery of instruments (WCSS) designed to assess
safety in women‟s facilities across multiple dimensions.
The following section will provide the variables that were utilized in the present
study, as well as, the reasons and rationales for including them.
Dependent Variables
The dependent variable, economic conflict is a composite measure, and it is
operationally defined by five items (questions) from the survey. The questions and their
factor loadings are represented in appendix A.
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Each of the questions (items) was measured by value from the five-point Likert
scale ranging from 1 (Not a problem) to 5 (Very big problem). The five-item version of
the inmate economic conflict measure has a reported Cronbach‟s alpha value of .940.
Independent Variables
The full list of variables in presented in appendix B.
Level 2 variables:
Type of institution (0 = jail, 1 = prison)
Level 1 variables:
Individual Factors:
Age at time of survey
Highest degree of education (1= less than high school, 8 = graduate degree)
Violent crime history (0 = no, 1 = yes)
Property crime history (0 = no, 1 = yes)
Drug offense crime history (0 = no, 1 = yes)
Other crime offense history (0 = no, 1 = yes)
Number of times has been in jail before this sentence or detention.
Number of times has been in prison before this sentence or detention.
Time (in years) have you served in this facility?
Time (in years) have you served in this housing unit?
Race of inmate (0= non-white, 1 = white).
Ethnicity (Are you Hispanic or Latino, 0 = no, 1 = yes).
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Social Climate Factors:
Inmates’ rating on how physically violent unit is measured by question 57 from
the WCSS and ranged from 1 (not physically violent) to 10 (very physically violent).
Inmates’ rating on how sexually violent unit is measured by question 58 from the
WCSS and ranged from 1(not sexually violent) to 10 (very sexually violent).
Generally different types of violence perpetrate each other in a secure prison
community. If physical or sexual violence takes place in housing units, it might
contribute to stealing, racketeering, or taking away somebody‟s property.
Inmates’ rating on the inmate sexual violence scale is measured by 12 survey
items (questions: 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20) and varies from 0 (not a
problem) to 4 (very big problem). The Cronbach‟s alpha was calculated to measure
reliability for the scale. The reported reliability of the scale was .968.
We assume it is possible for sexual violence to lead to economic conflict. Female
inmates who have been in close relationship with each other could have shared the same
property and capital. They could have also presented gifts to each other. Once their close
friendship is over, the process of carving up of the material possessions will inevitably
arise. Another scenario may include having sexual relationship for the purpose of
material prosperity. Sexual violence may also arise from the pimp‟s (a third party agent
who receives a part of the earnings) services. Those services are generally not free. So
problems with underpayment or non payment are frequent consequences of that business.
Therefore it is conceivable that challenges that initially originated in sexual violence may
lead to economic conflict.
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Inmates’ rating on the inmate physical violence scale are measured by 8 questions
from the survey (questions: 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 31) and ranged from 0 (not a
problem) to 4 (very big problem). The inmate physical violence scale has a reported
Cronbach‟s alpha value of .963.
Arguments, verbal threats and physical fights are well known activities in the
correctional institutions. Inmates‟ necessity to pay “protection” to other women in order
to keep themselves safe may precipitate engaging into illegal activities, such as stealing
and trading commodities or selling drugs and other contraband, in order to obtain extra
income.
Inmates’ rating on the staff verbal harassment scale was measured by 4 items
(questions: 32, 33, 34, 35). Inmates’ rating on the staff sexual harassment scale was
measured by 3 items (questions 36, 37, 38). Both scales ranged from 0 (not a problem) to
4 (very big problem). The staff verbal harassment scale has a reported Cronbach‟s alpha
value of .939. Cronbach‟s alpha value for the staff sexual harassment scale is .918.
Disrespectful attitude of custodial staff toward inmates (i.e. usage of improper
language, such as cursing; making sexual gestures or comments to women) precipitates
inmates to inevitably become scapegoats. As a result it is likely that other inmates will
pick up on the issue and transform it into a more serious problem. The relationships
between inmates in the light of unprofessional handling of the staff may lead to instances
when the inmate will be abused, harassed, and extorted; also her possessions might be
stolen or taken away by force.
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Inmates’ rating on the staff sexual misconduct scale was measured by 6 items
from the WCSS scale (questions: 40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46) and ranged from 0 (not a
problem at all) to 4 (very big problem). Cronbach‟s alpha for this scale was .941.
Prisoners generally neither possess enough material goods, nor even have the
ability to afford them. However, staff have an easy access to a variety of resources. It is
not uncommon for staff members to supply candy, coffee, soda or other commodities to
inmates in exchange for different favors. Moreover, while trading invaluable goods with
inmates, staff may cause a conflict between inmates who will compete to attain scarce
resources.
Inmates’ rating on the staff physical violence scale was measured by 4 items from
the WCSS scale (questions: 47, 48, 49, 50). The scale ranged from 0 = not a problem to 4
= very big problem. Cronbach‟s alpha for the scale is .908.
Staff physical violence may indicate that staff do not care about the well being of
a particular inmate. This fact might serve other inmates who may want to take economic
advantage over the inmate, since staff may not want to intervene with the issue.
Inmates’ rating on the likelihood of violence from inmates was measured by 3
items from the WCSS scale (questions: 51, 52, 53). The possible answers ranged from
1(strongly disagree) to 5(strongly agree). The Cronbach‟s alpha for the scale is .898.
Inmates’ rating on the likelihood of violence from staff was measured by 3 items from the
WCSS scale (questions: 54, 55, 56). The scale ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5
(strongly agree). The Cronbach‟s alpha for the scale is .858.
Garland (1990) pointed out that what people experience undoubtedly shapes how
they see the world. However, not everything can be experienced by ourselves. A lot of
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information and knowledge we get comes from observations, conversations, expectations
and other forms of cognition. In other words, our perception of the reality is very often
based on implied factors as opposed to direct experience. I would argue that this
perception is indeed the reality. So if a woman perceives that she might be physically of
sexually victimized by inmates or staff, she may try to pay “protection” in order to escape
victimization. Apprehension and fear of brutalization by staff may lead inmates to borrow
among themselves and to make favors to those who can protect them.
Inmate’s rating on the successfulness of facility procedures in protecting women
inmates was measured by 4 items from the WCSS scale (questions: 59a, 59b, 59c, 59d).
The scale ranges from 1 (strongly disagree), 5 (strongly agree). The Cronbach‟s alpha for
the scale is .860.
Inmates will not have to find a sophisticated way to protecting themselves if
procedures in the facility are successful enough to protect women from physical and
sexual violence. To the contrary, the failure of existing procedures to create safe a prison
environment will make inmates engaging into different activities to protect themselves.
Inmate’s ratings on staff harassment of inmates that report was measured by 4
items from the WCSS scale (questions: 60a, 60b, 60c, 60d). The scale ranged from 1
(strongly disagree), 5 (strongly agree). The Cronbach‟s alpha for the scale is .919.
Inmates are deprived of certain rights merely on the basis of being confined.
Except for the constitutional right to be protected against “deliberate indifference” on the
part of staff, prisoners do not have a legal right to be protected from any type of violence
against them. Therefore, often inmates have to rely on self-protection in the way it can
possibly be accomplished. Sykes acknowledged (1971) that the inmate subculture has a
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lot to do with power. Power is something that can protect you when staff and other
inmates cannot. Therefore, gaining power becomes a goal by itself. In order to achieve
this goal, inmates will steal and trade, hustle with commissary items and contraband. In
other words, they will do everything to gain financial stability and power to protect
themselves.
In one of the facilities we studied, an inmate stole a walkie talkie from a
correctional officer. As a result, the prisoner was able to make a cell phone (a high value
commodity in the penitentiaries) out of the walkie talkie‟s parts and other details. That
person had incredible power among inmates and was able to protect herself and other
inmates.
Inmate‟s ratings of inmate harassment toward inmates who report was measured
by 4 items from the WCSS scale (questions: 61a, 61b, 61c, 61d). The scale ranged from 1
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The Cronbach‟s alpha for the scale is .905.
The instances of harassing other inmates who report cases of extortion may
promote further violence. The inmate who is victimized may have to steal or trade
contraband in order to pay for her “protection”.
Statement of Hypotheses
Given what we know from the literature, I offer several hypotheses:
Hypothesis -1: There is a significant relationship between inmates‟ perceptions of
the economic conflict and the type of the facility (prison or jail). Multiple regression was
conducted to determine if there was a significant difference between inmate perception of
the economic conflict and being in prison or jail.
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Hypotheses -2: There is a significant relationship between individual
characteristics of the prisoners (age, race, highest degree of education, history of the
offences, number of times incarcerated, and the length of current sentence) and inmate
perception of the economic conflict. Hierarchical linear modeling was conducted using
only the first block of independent variables which are individual characteristics of the
prisoners.
Hypotheses -3: Controlling for the individual characteristics, there is a significant
relationship between the social climate factors of the institution (violence in housing
units, verbal and sexual harassment, facilities procedure and other) and inmate perception
of economic conflict. In order to test this hypothesis, the second block of independent
variables (organizational characteristics) was entered into the hierarchical linear
modeling.
Hypotheses -4: A deprivation model (social climate variables) is expected to be
better able explain and predict the economic conflict in the correctional facilities that an
importation model (individual and demographic variables). The hierarchical linear
modeling was conducted to find how much variance in the dependent variable can be
explained by individual and social climate independent variables, as well as by the type
of facility (jail or prison).
Limitations
The data collection instrument did not include all possible variables we would
want to examine (e.g., types of programming, more background variables, etc.). Also,
since this was a cross sectional study, the ability to capture social processes and change in
the correctional facilities is limited. However, we expect that the data collected from the
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questionnaire will still allow us to explore our hypotheses concerning the possible
predictors of the economic conflict phenomena.
Delimitations
Taking into consideration the diversity of the population, the data collection
instrument and consent forms were in both English and Spanish languages so the Spanish
speakers would not be excluded from the analyses. In certain instances when inmates had
difficulties with reading or understanding the questions, on site researchers read or
explained the data collection instrument to the subjects.
Assumptions
While preparing for the study we went through extensive procedures to make sure
that inmates‟ safety and anonymity were protected. Taking into account that inmates are
vulnerable subjects, full IRB approval was obtained as a part of arrangement of the study.
Providing inmates with explanation of the purpose of the study, as well as ensuring that
they have all necessary forms and contacts, researchers made every effort to remain
ethical and honest. As sympathetic and responsible researchers, we assumed that inmates
were thoughtful and honest while completing the surveys. However, given the human
factor and also institutional setting where the surveys were administered, researchers can
not fully rely on the primary collected data. So the subsequent quality control analysis
was utilized to discard the data that provided inadequate or imprecise information.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS

The purpose of this study was to describe the context of economic relationships in
women‟s correctional facilities as well as to identify factors that influence economic
conflict. Based on previous research, we hypothesized that the deprivation model will
have more sustainable and stringent effects in explaining inmate perceptions of economic
conflict in female correctional facilities. The present chapter describes the major findings.
Respondent Demographics
To assess the relationships between individual characteristics of the prisoners and
their perception of economic conflict, the survey contained a range of demographic and
background questions. Aggregated respondent demographic characteristics are
represented in Table 1.
For the nominal level variables, descriptive statistics include a number of cases in
a particular category and percentages. Interval-level variables are quantified by a number
of cases, means and standard deviations.
The average age of the prisoners was 38 years. More than half of the respondents
graduated from high school or had a GED. The majority of the confined female
population (81.2 %) served their sentence in state, federal and private prisons.
The race and ethnicity variables were collapsed into two categories of white and
non-white. This technique revealed that 33.1% of female inmates in correctional
institutions were non-white. Taking into consideration that in 2005 whites population was
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Table 1. Respondent Demographic Characteristics
Variable
Type of Institution

N
659
2840

%
18.8
81.2

Less than high school
High school diploma or GED
Vocational or trade school
certificate
Some College or undergraduate
work but no degree completed
Undergraduate college degree
completed
Graduate work beyond
completed college degree

681
2711

19.6
78.1

553

15.9

982

28.3

380

10.9

109

3.1

Race/Ethnicity (Collapsed)

Non–White
White

1148
2321

33.1
66.9

Violent Crime Offense History

No
Yes

2509
952

72.5
27.5

Property Crime Offense History

No
Yes

2880
581

83.2
16.8

Drug Offense Crime History

No
Yes

2120
1342

61.2
38.8

Other Crime Offense History

No
Yes

2384
1077

68.9
31.1

Highest Degree of Education (Collapsed)

Variable

Response
Jail
Prison

N

Mean

Standard
Deviation
10.41

Age

3461

38

How many times have you
been in jail before this
sentence or detention?

3425

4.34

8.19

How many times have you
been in prison before this
sentence or detention?

3445

0.73

1.60

How long (how many months)
have you served in this
facility?

3453

24.53

44.27

How long (how many months)
have you been in this housing
unit?

3437

11.15

22.89
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accounting for 237,855,000 (81.5%), and blacks for 37,909,000 (13%), this fact suggests
that the non-white female population is confined in correctional institutions at a
disproportionally high rate. With regard to the type of criminal offenses, the majority of
female inmates (38.8%) are convicted and placed in prison for drug related offenses. The
number of times female prisoners have been sentenced to correctional institutions, as well
as, the length of the current sentence, are highly skewed and kurtotic. These distributions
might have occurred as a ramification of including into the analysis the wide range of
long and short term correctional institutions. Therefore, in order to address the problem
correctly, further analysis is needed to distinguish between short term county jails and
long term private, state and federal facilities.
Descriptive Results from Inmate Economic Conflict Scale
Descriptive statistical analysis was also performed on the inmate economic
conflict scale. The percentages, means and standard deviations were calculated and
presented in Table 2. Higher means indicate higher perceptions of the inmate economic
conflict. The mean of the each question, as well as the overall mean, have a value
between one and two, which on the scale from zero to four, indicates somewhat between
a small and medium problem.
Assumptions
The WCSS instrument was constructed to measure several different perceptions
of economic conflict, some of which might be considered problematic by only a small
number of inmates (Wells et al., 2013). Therefore, it is expected that the data might be
skewed and kurtotic, as well as having some outliers. As part of the preparation for
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Very Big Problem

N

Mean

Standard
Deviation

3496

1.96

1.41

N

Big Problem

20.7

20.1

Women here have used
pressure or threats to
collect on debts

29.1

20.8

19.3

14.6

16.2

Women here have gotten
into physical fights with
other women inmates
over debts
Women here have used
pressure or threats to steal
from others

32.9

18.1

17.7

13.8

35.5

21.5

18.8

13.5

26.8

18.7

22.6

15.9

Women here have gotten
into verbal arguments
over debts

Women here have gotten
into physical fights over
theft.

20.7

Medium Problem

Small Problem

Item

Not a Problem at
all

Table 2. Descriptive Results from Inmate Economic Conflict Scale

18.6

Overall mean for Inmate
Economic Conflict Scale

18.7

3489

1.68

1.44

17.5

3489

1.65

1.49

10.7

3493

1.42

1.37

3490

1.81

1.45

3499

1.70

1.28

17.1

the higher-level analyses, the data were cleaned and screened for substantial skewness,
kurtosis and outliers. Although I identified items that were skewed and kurtotic, I believe
that these values are legitimate and carry important insights. The software that I utilized
for the study (Mplus 6.12) incorporates the Maximum Likelihood Robust (MLR)
estimator, which is robust to non normal data and non-independence of observations.
Therefore, MLR estimator was applied to satisfy any lack of normality of the data (Wells
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et al., 2013). The correlation matrix, condition indexes and variance proportions were
utilized to test to multicollinearity. No multivariate multicollinearity was found.
Multivariate Analyses
In order to test the hypotheses, hierarchical linear modeling was performed.
Overall three models were constructed. They are represented in Table 3.
Model 1
Hypothesis 1 stated “There is a significant relationship between inmate perception
of the economic conflict and the type of the facility (prison or jail).” To evaluate the
extent to which the IV (the type of institution) associated with the DV (inmate economic
conflict), the type of institution was entered in the model and remained the only
independent variable in the model. Model 1 showed that whether inmates were confined
in prison or jail had a moderate association (b =.446) with inmate perceptions of the
economic conflict. The relationship between type of institution and inmate economic
conflict was significant. The former explained 8.8% of the variance in the latter.
Therefore, hypothesis 1 is supported.
Model 2
Hypothesis 2 stated “There is a significant relationship between individual
characteristics of the prisoners (age, race, highest degree of education, history of the
offenses, number of times incarcerated, and the length of current sentence) and inmate
perceptions of economic conflict.” To evaluate the extent to which a number of IVs
(individual characteristics of the prisoners) correlated with the DV (inmate economic
conflict), the former were entered in the model; the type of institution also remained in
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Table 3. Multi-Level Models of Perceptions of Economic Conflict among Women Inmates
Predictors of economic conflict

Model 1
Estimate

Intercept

Model 2
S.E.

Estimate

S.E.

1.310

**

(.097)

1.181

**

(.140)

Type of institution

.446

*

(.158)

.432

*

(.158)

R-Square (between)

.088

(.059)

.086

Level 2
(.059)

Level 1
Age at time of survey

.004

Highest degree of education

*

-.026

(.002)
(.056)

Violent crime history

.110

Property crime history

.124

(.069)

Drug offense crime history

-.035

(.050)

Other type of crime history

.019

(.049)

Number of times have been in jail?

.000

(.003)

Number of times have been in prison?

.020

(.015)

How many years have served in this facility?

.001

(.001)

How many years have you served in this unit?

-.002

Whether race of inmate is white

-.083

Ethnicity
Inmates‟ rating (I. R.) on how physically
violent unit

*

(.055)

(.010)
*

(.041)

.024

(.069)

.012

(.004)

I. R. on how sexually violent unit
I. R. on the inmate sexual violence scale
I. R. on the inmate physical violence scale
I. R. on the staff verbal harassment scale
I. R. on the staff sexual harassment scale
I. R. on the staff sexual misconduct
I. R. on the staff physical violence scale
I. R. on the likelihood of violence from inmates
I. R. on the likelihood of violence from staff
Success. of facility procedures in
protecting women inmates
Staff harassment of inmates that report
Inmate harassment of inmates that report
R-Square (within)

N/A

Note: Standard errors are displayed in parentheses
*p<.05; **p<0.01.
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Table 3 (continued)
Predictors of economic conflict

Model 3

Intercept

Estimate

S.E.

1.629

.044

**

Level 2
Type of institution

0.063

(.056)

R-Square (between)

0.026

(.045)

Level 1
Age at time of survey

.004

*

(.002)

Highest degree of education

-.058

(.039)

Violent crime history

0.028

(.038)

Property crime history

0.053

(.041)

Drug offense crime history

0.039

(.033)

Other type of crime history

0.019

(.032)

-0.003

(.002)

Number of times have been in prison?

0.019

(.010)

How many years have served in this facility?

0.001

**

(.000)

-.002

*

(.001)

Number of times have been in jail?

How many years have you served in this unit?
Whether race of inmate is white
Ethnicity
Inmates‟ rating (I. R.) on how physically
violent unit

-0.047

(.031)

-.034

(.050)

0.047

I. R. on how sexually violent unit

**

-0.013

(.012)
(.011)

I. R. on the inmate sexual violence scale

0.237

**

(.026)

I. R. on the inmate physical violence scale

0.533

**

(.025)

I. R. on the staff verbal harassment scale

0.066

**

(.013)

0.091

**

(.033)

I. R. on the staff sexual harassment scale
I. R. on the staff sexual misconduct

-0.023

(.030)

I. R. on the staff physical violence scale

-0.002

(.024)

0.016

(.016)

I. R. on the likelihood of violence from inmates
I. R. on the likelihood of violence from staff
Success. of facility procedures in
protecting women inmates

-0.080

*

Staff harassment of inmates that report

-0.040

*

(.019)

Inmate harassment of inmates that report

0.032

*

(.014)

R-Square (within)

0.652

-0.025

Note: Standard errors are displayed in parentheses
*p<.05; **p<0.01.
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(.040)
(.017)

(.017)

the model. Hierarchical linear modeling indicated that only three of them (age, violent
crime history and race) were significant predictors of inmate perceptions of economic
conflict. Age and violent crime history are positively associated with the dependent
variable. In other words, older inmates and inmates who had committed at least one
violent crime tended to have higher perceptions of economic conflict in the institution.
With regard to race, non-white respondents tended to perceive economic conflict as more
problematic. Overall the degree of explanation by individual factors is less than
impressive at 1.2 % of the variance. With respect to model 2, the effect of the variable,
type of institution, remained significant and explained 8.6% of the variance in the
dependent variable. The fact that three of the individual factors are significant in the
model lends support to hypothesis 2.
Model 3
Hypothesis 3 stated “Controlling for the individual characteristics, there is a
significant relationship between social climate factors of the institution (violence in
housing units, verbal and sexual harassment, facilities procedure and other) and inmate
perceptions of economic conflict.” Model 3 assessed the relationship between inmate
economic conflict and social climate factors, while also accounting for personal
characteristics and the effects of the type of institution. Multilevel modeling identified
eight items that contributed significantly to the variance in inmates‟ perceptions of
economic conflict.
Once social climate factors were added to the model, they accounted for the
changes among individual predictors. While age, remained in the model as a significant
predictor of inmate economic conflict, violent crime history and race of the inmate
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dropped out. However, two other variables, time served in the facility and time served in
the housing unit, became significant predictors. The model revealed a weak positive
correlation between the dependent variable and time served in the facility. A possible
explanation follows. Those who spent a long time in the institution had been subjected to
the prisonization phenomena. They became fully accustomed to the inmate code as well
as the norms and rules of the institution. For them the prison environment was neither
scary nor intimidating anymore. It seems likely that ties with the outside world and
contacts were gone, and inmates had to rely on themselves. In conjunction with the
reality in which prison did not provide even the essentials, this was a major implication
for why the prisoners perceived the economic victimization as so problematic.
Model 3 also established a weak negative correlation between the perception of
the economic conflict and the variable time spent in the housing unit. Here is the possible
explanation. When coming into a new housing unit, inmates were likely to experience a
range of emotions varying from hope to fear. The housing unit was not a private suite, but
a small secure facility full of other women with whom the new inmate would have to
establish some type of contact. The new housing unit represented uncertainty. Therefore,
during the period of adjustment to the new environment inmates‟ perceptions of conflict
were much higher than in a regular well known environment.
With respect to social climate factors, higher perceptions of conflict were
predicted by higher ratings of how physically violent the unit was; inmate sexual and
physical violence; staff verbal and sexual harassment and harassment of inmates who
report. Inmate physical violence was the strongest predictor of economic conflict in the
facility.
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A strong positive correlation between inmate perceptions of economic conflict
and inmate physical violence was expected. Instances where women chose to use
physical violence as a method of solving problems are indicating that these women had
something the other female wanted. It can be a partner, a material position, or a status. To
secure her own position or merely escape violence, a female prisoner often had to pay for
protection.
Inmate sexual violence was strongly positively correlated with the inmate
economic conflict. Prison homosexual relationships are “reinforced if not motivated by
economics” (Williams & Fish, 1974, p. 110). Williams and Fish (1974) continue, once
devotion and affection are established, an inmate, particularly the one who plays the
manly role, may demand goods and services in exchange for the assurance of fidelity.
Augmenting this behavior with “threats, love, jealousy and even anger due to
unfaithfulness” (Williams & Fish, 1974, p. 110) resulted in the escalation of inmate
economic conflict.
Higher ratings of how physically violent unit were strong predictors of inmate
perceptions of economic conflict. If the majority of women in a particular housing unit
are violent, other inmates might live in constant fear for their own safety and for the
safety of the little that they have in their possessions.
Both staff verbal and sexual harassment were moderate predictors of inmate
perceptions of economic conflict. Staff verbal and sexual harassment represent a
significant violation of professional prisoner handling and typically result from poor,
incompetent and corrupt prison administrators. This might occur because staff members
share a general ideology, according to which inmates are not entitled to the abundance of
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material possessions, to decent and humane treatment, to attain more than people in the
free society can attain. Under this ideology, correctional staff do not strive to help
prisoners do their time, rehabilitate them, and provide them safe conditions to live and
develop. Under the aforesaid ideology inmates not only suffer from miserable conditions
of confinement, but also from inappropriate handling by staff. Being left on their own for
survival, prisoners tend to take advantage of the little that black market system provides.
Inmate harassment of inmates who report was a weak positive predictor of the
inmate economic conflict. Not all inmates subscribe to the inmate code. To the contrary,
female prison “is a society of snitches” (Williams & Fish, 1972, p. 117). If a snitch got
harassed, it is likely that she would keep reporting harassment and other activities. Her
reports might undermine the smooth running of the black economic market.
This study found inverse relationships between two independent variables
(likelihood of violence from staff and inmate harassment of inmates who report) and
inmate perceptions of economic conflict. At first glance it seemed counter-intuitive;
however, this inverse relationship could be an outcome of the depriving prison
environment that imposes different coping strategies by both inmate and staff. One
explanation for the inverse relation between likelihood of violence from staff and
inmates‟ perception of the economic conflict might be the following. Correctional
personnel are more lenient in female institutions because women rarely serve time for
violent offences and do not possess much threat neither to society nor to themselves.
Therefore, there are two possibilities. The first one is staff might not interfere with any
activity that is taking place in housing units, and inmates themselves successfully run the
underground economy. While some inmate groups are welcome to be included in the
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flourishing illegal business, other social types of prisoners such as snitches cannot be
trusted and therefore are left behind. Since staff members let inmates deal with arising
issues, inmates perceive economic conflict to be more problematic. The other possibility
is the staff is overly oppressive and does not tolerate any illegal economic relationships.
Therefore, most opportunities for involvement into a sub rosa economy are shut down by
staff members, which simultaneously will reduce the inmate perception of economic
conflict.
Ratings on staff harassment of inmates who report were also inversely correlated
with inmate economic conflict. The unwritten rule of an every prison is that “The officers
are on one side and the inmates on the other and never the two shall meet”
(Giallombardo, 1966, p.166). Inmates who break this rule hurt the secretive sub rosa
economy. If staff members do not punish snitches by legitimate or illegitimate means,
and to the contrary, cooperate with them, it might create potential problems to both legal
and illegal inmate economic exchange.
Overall, social climate factors explained a significant amount (65.2%) of the
variance in economic conflict. Once social climate factors entered the model, the
institution where inmates serve their sentence (prison or jail) became non-significant.
Therefore, hypothesis 3 is supported.
Hypothesis 4 addressed relationships between two models (importation, based on
individual characteristics of the women prisoners and deprivation, based on social climate
variables) and their ability to predict the economic conflict. A deprivation model was
expected to be able better explain and predict the economic conflict in the correctional
facilities. Our findings confirmed the hypothesis. Indeed deprivation factors accounted
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for 65.2% of variance in the dependent variable, while individual and demographic
characteristics of the prisoners explained only 1.2% of the economic conflict. These
results indicated further evidence that environment is a key factor when it comes to
examining inmate economic conflict. Environment as it shapes and perpetrates economic
conflict will be further discussed in the following chapter.

63

CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
This thesis has described my study of whether individual factors or social
climate factors are more important in predicting inmate economic conflict. In this
study I used a secondary database collected from 3,499 respondents to examine
their perception of inmate economic conflict in correctional facilities. While
revious studies (Edgar, O‟Donnel, & Martin, 2003; Owen, 1998; Pollock, 1990)
acknowledged the economic victimization in correctional facilities, their primary
concern revolved around other issues in corrections. This study has expanded the
body of knowledge due to examination of economic conflict as a primary research
question.
A summary of descriptive findings indicated that inmate perceived
economic conflict was a small to medium problem in magnitude. The factors
related to these inmate perceptions are described below.
According to my analysis, there was minimal variation on the demographic
characteristics of inmates (i.e., background, type of offences, and level of education) in
the majority of correctional facilities. To the contrary, social atmosphere and inmate-staff
relationships varied significantly from institution to institution. (James B. Wells, personal
communication February 6, 2013). It was found later that this atmosphere has a great
potential to alter inmate perceptions of economic conflict. Therefore, the study addressed
this ongoing question: What accounts for such critical variation among inmate
perceptions of economic conflict in different housing units?
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This study demonstrated that all strong and significant predictors of economic
conflict, with the exception of age, and time served in the facility and in the particular
housing unit do not pertain to inmate demographic characteristics. Instead, significant
predictors of economic conflict in correctional institutions are social climate variables.
Therefore, in order to change the inmate perception of economic conflict, the
environment of the institution should be changed. Some recommendations will be
provided in thischapter.
Multilevel modeling showed that different forms of victimization are closely
connected to economic conflict. In such a manner, inmate physical and sexual violence,
staff verbal and sexual violence, and inmate harassment of inmates who report were
strong and significant predictors of inmate economic conflict.
Limitations and Implications for Future Research
While current quantitative analyses allowed me to find what factors are predictive
of economic conflict in the facilities in general, I was unable to establish causal order
between variables. Also because I used archived data, I was unable to include a number
of additional variables that could have been applicable to the study. Examples of
questions and potential predictors variables that could have been addressed are presented
below.
What is your family status?
Were you employed prior to incarceration?
What was your income prior to incarceration?
How often do you receive visits from your family members or friends?
How often do you receive presents from family and friends?
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Do you receive any financial support from your family while incarcerated?
How much money are you allowed to spend in prison commissary weekly?
Does black market economy take place in your housing unit?
What are three items that you would have brought to prison if you were allowed
to bring them with you?
While model 3 explained impressive amount of variability in economic conflict, I
was not able to study all possible predictor variables. The literature review and prison
observations and interviews lead me to believe that the prison economic conflict
phenomenon is subject to a number of different forces that were beyond the scope of my
analyses given the use of achieved data. Therefore, though my analyses could not reveal
all these different forces, I suspect that these forces might play an important role in
predicting inmate economic conflict, and therefore, have to be acknowledged. Drawing
on the literature review as well as theory, I incorporated different forces in a model
intended to explain economic conflict in the correctional facilities. The model is
represented in Figure 1. The model presents six different forces (inmate demographic and
individual characteristics, wider cultural forces, opportunities for sub rosa economy,
economic relationships in wider society, and rationalization) that shape inmate
perceptions of economic conflict. Inmate demographic and individual characteristics
were presented in table 1. However, each of the remaining forces will be the focus of the
following discussion.
Wider Cultural and Structural Forces
One of the reasons prisoners have economic conflict is because there are so many
shortages of resources in the prison environment. The reference to a prison as an “island
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Figure 1. Forces that shape inmate perception of economic conflict.

of poverty” made throughout this and other studies has immediate relevance for
understanding economic conflict (Williams & Fish, 1974). One of the major reasons for
such shortages is the principle of less eligibility, according to which, prisoners should not
live in better conditions than the lowest class of people in free society (Rusche &
Kirchheimer, 1968). Cultural ideas of how little prisoners should be entitled to exert a
major impact on the way prisons are operated and what is made available within them
(i.e., prisoners should not be entitled to higher education, employment, health care). If
people in regular society cannot afford college, or receive medical assistance, why should
individuals who are incarcerated have that ability? In addition to the principle of less
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eligibility, there are wider cultural sentiments and mentalities that address prison culture
such as fear of crime and cultural conceptions of the kinds of people that prisoners are
(i.e., dangerous others). These conceptions have a major impact on policies and practices
that are enacted in the prison system. Examples of such policies may be an abolition of
the last meal in Texas execution cases, the lack of adequate heath care and rehabilitative
programs in prisons throughout the U.S., the scarcity of basic hygiene products for
female prisoners, poor quality of food and lack of nutrition, etc. Not only prisoners seen
as less eligible; they are also seen as undeserving. While having such shortages in prison
resources is culturally palatable, it also results in competition over the little that is
available through legal or illegal channels. Ironically, the economic conflict can serve to
reinforce the very cultural conception of prisoners that gave rise to such conflict initially.
Opportunities for Sub Rosa Economy
As discussed previously, shortages in prison are a great source of economic
conflict. However, inmate perceptions of economic conflict do not derive merely from
prison shortages, but from shortages in interactions with opportunities. This conclusion is
especially obvious while observing inmates in segregation or on death row. Many of
these prisoners are locked up in individual cells for 23 hours a day and have very little
potential and very little opportunity for involvement in illicit economic exchange. Even
though these inmates are heavily affected by the scarcity of prison resources, they
generally perceive the scarcity as deprivation, rather than as economic conflict. To the
contrary, inmates who live in shared housing units are together most of the time and have
more opportunities to get involved in illicit economic exchange. Also inmates in less
secure, less oppressive environments have more resources; accordingly they are going to
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have more opportunities for economic conflict to develop. Therefore, a dynamic between
shortages and opportunities is one of the sources of economic conflict in correctional
facilities.
Economic Relationships in Wider Society
As mentioned in Chapter 2, in the earlier part of 20th century a Russian jurist,
Evginiy Pashukanis (1978), described that punishment practices are based on, driven by,
and reflect the principles of economic exchange in wider society. As a jurist,
Pashukanis‟s analysis revolved around sentencing; nonetheless the implications of his
analysis proliferate far beyond court settings and go into both policing and corrections.
When punishment is carried out in sentencing and later in prison, Pashukanis‟s theory
would predict that the direction that punishment takes will mirror economic relations in
the wider society. If Pashukanis (1978) was right and punishment practices are a
replication of principles of private market exchange in a wider capitalist society, his
findings would have profound implications for our work because principles of economic
exchange will significantly impact how women deal with one another and how they deal
with staff behind bars. I could not test his theory based on the data available. However,
the logic for future research might be grounded on the following premises. Our culture
promotes a stereotype, according to which a certain standard of commodity consumption
constitutes a beautiful woman, such as the right look, the right clothes, and the right make
up, etc. Simultaneously, popular culture promotes another stereotype, according to which
prisoners are construed as less deservingness individuals. However, in order to analyze
the concept of deserving, it should be understood that this concept itself is an economic
category that derives from economic exchange practices. The American culture deals
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with people behind bars based on economic exchange principles. Prisoners, as less
deserving then the rest of society, should live in worse condition than people from low
classes; prisoners should not receive medical care if people from low classes cannot. The
same ideas apply to food, education, employment, etc. Overall, prisoners should suffer
more that anybody else in free society. Inmates should experience pain based on simple
economic logic because they have already forfeited their freedom by committing a
criminal act.
Though Pashukanis‟s (1978) theory does not apply specifically to the variables
that I have studied as part of thesis project, it does explain why economic conflicts exist
in institutions in the first place. In other words, his theory is a tool to address the origins
of the conflict that might be successfully utilized in future research. Put simply,
principles of commodity exchange are valued in American culture, and these principles
are diffuse in their effects across social institutions, including penality.
If we want to be able to predict economic conflict in the prison environment, one
of the things that follows from Pashukanis‟s theory is to look at economic conditions in
the wider society. Economic conflicts in wider society should be replicated in some form
behind prison walls. For example, during the period of a recession, when there is a lot of
insecurity and anxiety over employment, the job market, budget constrains, and other
issues in the wider society, there is likely to be increased resource shortage and
competition among the different governmental agencies. These shortages will invariably
find their way behind prison walls and increase economic conflict there. If prison culture
really is a microcosm of wider society, then we will expect to see more economic conflict
behind bars when the economy in wider society is in depression or recession stages. This
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economic impact can be measured both quantitatively and qualitatively. Rather than
measuring the demographic characteristics of the prisoners, or prison social climate
variables, another category of environmental variables should capture how culture and
the economy affect prison. Potential questions might be:
Have you spent eight or more years in correctional facilities?
If yes, how have conditions of confinement changed since the early part of the
sentence?
Rationalization
Prison deprives people of basic needs: freedom, autonomy, social identity, capital
accumulation and more (Sykes, 1971). While some individuals would justify this
deprivation as a way to impose retribution, others would justify it based on security
concerns; still others may find that depriving people from their unique identity would
help with their management. I will show how deprivation and management go hand in
hand together.
Prisoners do not have names; they have a unique assigned number. Prisoners do
not keep their own clothes; instead they wear uniforms. Prisoners are deprived of their
identity because of the rationalization process, a process which maximizes control and
efficiency, such as treating people with sameness, having rules, regulations and
procedures. A key of rationalization is imposing a large number of rules over prisoners.
New inmates coming into prison receive a rule book which specifies the appropriate way
to dress, to behave, what inmates are allowed to receive through visitations, what food
they allow to have in their cells, etc. All aforesaid procedures help with efficient and
rationalized management of a large number of inmates.
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Prison is a classic example of a bureaucratic organization. It is comprised of
hundreds and even thousands of different mechanisms (rules, regulations, policies,
interpersonal relationships between staff and inmates) that should be managed effectively
and efficiently. Official proliferation and adherence to the rules make it easier to run the
prison. It is easier to run a prison when everybody dresses alike, when everybody engages
in certain activities at a certain time, when no one is allowed to have long hair or make
up; when prisoners can only possess a certain amount of money on their account, and
they can only withdraw a certain amount of money at any given time. Inmates in high
security prison, as well as in administrative segregation and isolation are prohibited of
most personal possessions. Staff members justify such strict actions as security
precautions, which in some cases might be true, but this rationalization and security risk
mask the massive shortages of resources that prisoners may utilize. This lack of resources
encourage prisoners to get involved into immoral or even illegal activities while
incarcerated. A desire to satisfy basic needs, such as having enough food, drinks, cloth or
hygiene products, encourages prisoners to participate in a black market economy. Once a
black market economy is established, management will face another bureaucratic task to
keep this underground economy under control. Therefore, the rationale to deny prisoners
basic needs generally leads to uprising of irrational black market, the regulation and
control of which is significantly more difficult compared to an open economy.
Rationality thus begets more of itself.
The rationalization which facilitates management deprives people from their basic
needs and often leads to irrationality. Rationalization in the way described above both
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causes and shapes economic conflict. In turn, such conflict shapes and reproduces
rationality.
To conclude, the aforementioned model is not the result of my quantitative
analyses. It is rather an inductive outcome of the following: extensive literature review;
quantitative analyses; inmates‟ written comments in the open ended questions section of
the survey; conversations with my thesis chair Dr. Wells who gathered the data (James B.
Wells, personal communication), and a member of my thesis committee, who has
knowledge of penology (Kevin I. Minor, personal communication). My study neither
tested, nor confirmed this model. My study had a different research question, and that
research question was fully answered. We found that social climate factors have a better
ability to explain and predict economic conflict than individual factors. However,
literature also has some suggestions as to how economic conflict might originate.
Therefore, I simply presented that the factors that originate this conflict might be the next
step for future research.
Overall, from a research perspective, my findings open up new possibilities for
testing theory or other ideas as to how to regulate and possibly prevent inmate economic
conflict (i.e., testing an aforesaid model). However, additional research is needed to
establish a causal model. This can be accomplished by using structural equation
modeling.
Implications for Practice
The identification of major factors that may predict inmate economic conflict is
critical in order to develop the best practices for its prevention, intervention and
illumination. Therefore, the findings from my research may be used by correctional
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administrators to identify risks and possibly prevent inmate economic conflict in prison
settings.
Since in my study individual factors like age, race, educational background, type
of offense, etc. explain only about 1% of the variation in the dependent variable, these
demographic characteristics of prisoners are not critical when it comes to inmate
economic conflict. The major predictors of economic conflict are prison environment
variables. Therefore, correctional personnel should devote more of their attention to the
environmental factors of a particular institution, including issues from prison design and
operational capacity to staff-inmate relationships. Overcrowding itself is a major source
of instability, victimization and violence (Wells, et al., 2012). In my research I observed a
facility where a housing unit with design capacity of 48 inmates confined 76 women at
one time. These women had to sleep on rollaway beds in the general areas. The beds were
so close to each other that women could not get up from one bed without touching other
beds, including shoes and personal belongings of other prisoners. Economic conflict has
strong potential to flourish in such environments where any expectation of privacy is
gone, and prisoners from multiple housing units have unlimited access to other inmates‟
belongings.
Another social climate consideration is the existing degree of inmate sexual and
physical violence in facilities. My study found that both sexual and physical violence are
strong and significant predictors of economic conflict. In order to successfully prevent
and handle instances of violence and consequently decrease perceptions of economic
conflict in housing units, there is a strong need for a sufficient number of trained staff
members. Therefore, correctional facilities where one staff member is assigned to
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supervise two housing units might be more susceptible to the existence of physical and
sexual violence between prisoners.
Another significant predictor of economic conflict is the relationship between
inmates and staff. This study found inverse relationships between likelihood of violence
from staff, staff harassment of inmates who report and inmate perceptions of economic
conflict. Higher ratings on likelihood of violence from staff and staff harassment of
inmates who report are associated with lower inmate perceptions of economic conflict.
This finding may at first appear as counter intuitive. However, an important pattern might
be hidden behind these inverse relationships. Likelihood of violence from staff could be a
proxy for staff oppression; the greater level of staff oppression, the less opportunity exists
for prisoners to be involved in the black market. Oppressive staff are going to shut down
black markets largely or completely. As a consequence, most opportunities for economic
conflict will disappear simultaneously.
A similar pattern links staff harassment of inmates who report and perceptions of
inmate economic conflict. If inmates feel that they are going to get harassed by staff
simply for reporting an activity, it is repression. The more repression inmates experience,
the less they will report in the future. Therefore, economic conflict might still exist in the
housing units, but it will take a more subtle form. This reaffirms a basic Durkheimian
point that more oppressive society becomes, the less deviance there will be because there
will be less potential for the latter.
Other significant predictors of economic conflict include staff verbal and sexual
harassment. Staff verbal and sexual harassment might be a form of punishment that
correctional personnel inflict on prisoners for their past criminal activity. Staff members
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may need to receive additional training on issues such as work ethics, morals, and
empathy, or even get familiar with how prisonization transpires in modern societies.
Pashukanis (1978) explained this logic as follows. By committing a criminal offense, an
individual involuntarily signed a contract with the state to accept punishment (retribution)
as payment for the crime. In modern, bourgeois capitalist society, retribution for the
crime is imposed by deprivation of freedom for a definite term that is previously
established by a judge (i.e., human labor time, proportional to the criminal act, is in itself
a concrete payment for a crime). Correctional personnel should have understanding that a
prisoner‟s obligation to spend a certain amount of time in a correctional institution is
punishment in itself. Prisoners should not be punished additionally because they are in
prison. To the contrary, there is a continuous issue when state power is abused and
corrections employee harass prisoners, inflict physical and emotional pain on them
beyond that already inflicted by the court order. The destination of correctional personnel
is not to judge, punish, or humiliate individuals behind bars, but to enforce safety,
security and deliver corrective practices that are only declared by law.
To summarize, from a practical perspective, findings from the WCSS can be used
by correctional administrators to identify the potential risk of the inmate economic
conflict in housing units. Also, operational needs such as designing staff training,
improving reporting and investigative mechanisms might be identified and addressed in
order to reduce inmate perceptions of economic conflict and overall make a facility a
safer place to live and work.
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Conclusion
More that four decades ago Williams & Fish (1974) found that inmates‟
adjustment to institutionalization, especially the way they arrange and share material
possessions and regard prison officials, are the outcome of the deprivations of
incarceration. This study supported the aforesaid statement. With all factors (independent
variables) combined, I was able to explain 65.2% of the variation in inmate perceptions
of inmate economic conflict. However, while the individual characteristics of the inmates
(importation model) accounted for only 1.2% of the variance, social factors (i.e., prison
environment) accounted for 64.9% of the variance in the dependent variable. Therefore,
despite social myths about violent super predators who upon entering correctional
institutions spread fear among correctional personnel and inmates, imported factors were
not supported by the current study as predictors of economic conflict. To the contrary, the
majority of residents of the correctional institutions are non-violent drug abusers,
individuals who violated their probation responsibilities, or committed financial or
property offences. Only 27.5% of the confined women population who participated in
this study were incarcerated for violent criminal offence. However, this 27.5% (952
women out of 3,499) do not make a difference when it comes to economic conflict
because at least as measured in our study, violent crime history is not a significant
predictor of inmate perceptions of economic conflict.
To summarize, this found significant predictors of inmate economic conflict. I
showed that perception of economic conflict does not come from the color of the skin,
from the highest level of education of the prisoners or other personal factors. It also does
not derive from the offense history or the number of sentences an individual had served
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throughout her life. Where does the perception of the economic conflict come from,
contrarily, is the environment of the institution. Therefore, in order to predict and avoid
this conflict, the social environment of the institution (i.e., interpersonal relationships
between inmates and staff members) should be addressed, transformed and supervised.
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APPENDIX A.
Operational Definition of Inmate Economic Conflict.
Factor Loadings.
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Factor
Questions

Loadings

Q1. Women here have gotten into verbal arguments over debts

.814

Q2. Women here have used pressure or threats to collect on debts).

.881

Q3. Women here have gotten into physical fights with other women
inmates over debts

.899

Q4. Women here have used pressure or threats to steal from others

.730

Q5. Women here have gotten into physical fights over theft

.779
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APPENDIX B.
Predictors of Inmate Perceptions of Inmate Economic Conflict.
.
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1. Type of institution (0 = jail, 1 = prison)
2. Age at time of survey
3. Highest degree of education (1= less than high school, 8 = graduate degree)
4. Violent crime history (0 = no, 1 = yes)
5. Property crime history (0 = no, 1 = yes)
6. Drug offense crime history (0 = no, 1 = yes)
7. Other crime offense history (0 = no, 1 = yes)
8. Number of times has been in jail before this sentence or detention.
9. Number of times has been in prison before this sentence or detention.
10. How much time (in years) have you served in this facility?
11. How much time (in years) have you served in this housing unit?
12. Race of inmate (0= non-white, 1 = white).
13. Ethnicity (Are you Hispanic or Latino, 0 = no, 1 = yes).
14. Inmates‟ rating on how physically violent unit (1= not physically violent, 10 =
very physically violent).
15. Inmates‟ rating on how sexually violent unit (1= not sexually violent, 10 = very
sexually violent).
16. Inmates‟ rating on the inmate sexual violence scale (0 = not a problem, 4 = very
big problem).
17. Inmates‟ rating on the inmate physical violence scale (0 = not a problem, 4 = very
big problem).
18. Inmates‟ rating on the staff verbal harassment scale (0 = not a problem, 4 = very
big problem).
19. Inmates‟ rating on the staff sexual harassment scale (0 = not a problem, 4 = very
big problem).
20. Inmates‟ rating on the staff sexual misconduct (6 items, 0 = not a problem at all,
4= very big problem).
21. Inmates‟ rating on the staff physical violence scale (0 = not a problem, 4 = very
big problem)
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22. Inmates‟ rating on the likelihood of violence from inmates (3 items, 1= strongly
disagree, 5= strongly agree).
23. Inmates‟ rating on the likelihood of violence from staff (3 items, 1= strongly
disagree, 5= strongly agree).
24. Inmate‟s rating on the successfulness of facility procedures in protecting women
inmates (4 items, 1== strongly disagree, 5= strongly agree).
25. Inmate‟s ratings on staff harassment of inmates that report (4 items, 1 = strongly
disagree, 5= strongly agree).
26. Inmate‟s ratings on inmate harassment of inmates that report (4 items, 1 =
strongly disagree, 5= strongly agree).
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